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The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure*
Henry G. McMahon**
INTRODUCTION
For the past century and a half Louisiana has been a veri-
table laboratory of comparative law. Its juridical heritage from
France and Spain, and its acquisition by the United States, pre-
cipitated an immediate struggle between the Romanistic and
English systems of law. Louisiana's admission into the Union
required adoption of the constitutional and public law of Amer-
ica. A flourishing trade and commercial intercourse with its sis-
ter states made the adoption of Anglo-American commercial law
expedient. The failure of the Louisiana Legislature, in 1824, to
adopt Edward Livingston's enlightened penal code resulted in a
juridical vacuum which the Anglo-American common law of
crimes and criminal procedure found relatively easy to fill. But
in the extremely important area of private law the Romanistic
system emerged triumphant: the civilian customs and institu-
tions of the former colony were retained and perpetuated
through the 1808 codification and the Louisiana Civil Code of
1825, the latter modeled upon the Code Napoleon. A lesser vic-
tory was scored by the Romanistic system in the field of civil
procedure, where Livingston skillfully blended Continental pro-
cedural principles with judicial administrative provisions of
Anglo-American origin.
Competition between these two great legal systems did not
end, however, with this early demarcation of spheres of influ-
*This article is largely a consolidation and revision of portions of prior writings
of the author.
Parts I and II thereof are based, to a considerable extent, on The Background,
Structure, and Composition of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 7 LA. B.J.
246 (1960) ; The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, a paper prepared for the
Mexican Congress of Procedural Law, which is being published by the Mexican
Institute of Procedural Law; and The Proposed Louisiana Code of Practice: A
Synthesis of Anglo-American and Continental Civil Procedures, an article prepared
for the International Congress of Civil Procedure in Vienna. A condensation of
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ence. The training of Louisiana lawyers in the national law
schools of America, the ultimate loss by the Louisiana practition-
er and judge of the ability to read French and Spanish, and the
greater availability of American legal literature, all permitted
the influence of Anglo-American law to erode the civil law and
procedure of the state. These inroads of the English common
law, however, were the result of interstitial seepage between the
provisions of the positive law of Louisiana, rather than an under-
mining of its foundations. In due time a reaction was to set in.
The great improvement in legal education in Louisiana, which
commenced roughly thirty-five years ago, brought an almost im-
mediate revival of interest in its civil law and procedure. The
publication of law reviews by the three law schools of the state
provided, for the first time, the scholarly research and doctrinal
writings so necessary for the nourishment of any civilian system.
A. decade or so later, the Louisiana State Law Institute was
established as the official research and law reform agency of
the state, with generous support from public funds. The Insti-
tute, utilizing as it does the combined knowledge and energies of
members of the legislature, the judiciary, the bar, and of the law
faculties, has given a tremendous impetus to law reform and im-
provement in Louisiana. Its work in the drafting of the projet
of the new procedural code was much more than a consolidation
and editorial revision of the pre-existing rules of civil procedure.
True, those principles, concepts, and devices which have proven
effective and workable in actual practice are retained. But the
improvements in procedure achieved under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, by the more recent procedural codes of the vari-
ous American states, and by the more advanced codes of civil
procedure of Continental countries were studied carefully, with
the view of improving Louisiana's procedure through a borrow-
ing of the more effective procedural principles and devices of
other states and countries. More than any other American code,
the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is a product of the com-
parative method.
Procedure is only the means of enforcing and implementing
the substantive law. To perform its proper role, it must be cor-
related to the substantive law which it is designed to enforce. As
the substantive law of Louisiana is partly of Romanistic and
partly of English origin, it is not surprising to find that in the'




. An appraisal of the procedural system which will beushered
in through the adoption of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure,
and an evaluation of the contributions which are made thereto
by both Continental and Anglo-American civil procedures, is one
of the objects of the present article. Such an analysis, however,:
would be impossible- without some mention of the various pro-
cedural systems in effect in Louisiana in the past.
I. THE BACKGROUND
Procedural Systems Prior to 1825
Though France claimed the vast Louisiana Territory as early
as.1682, by virtue of the explorations of La Salle, no serious effort
was made to colonize any part of the vast expanse until 1699,
when d'Iberville set up the first settlement on the coast Iof the
Gulf of Mexico. No civil government worthy of the name was
established until 1712, when the colony was granted to Crozat.
Under the latter's charter, it was provided -that the Custom of
Paris- that most interesting combination of Germanic custom
and Roman law which had been codified in the sixteenth century
-. should be in effect throughout the territory. The expense of
colonization proved too great a drain upon the resources of even
the immensely wealthy Crozat, so that in 1717 he was compelled
to surrender his charter. Thereupon, a grant of the colony was
made to John Law's Company of the West, under a charter which
confirmed the applicability of the Custom of Paris to the Louisi-
ana territory. After the bankruptcy of the Company of the West
in 1732, the French monarch was forced to take over the Louisi-
ana territory as a crown colony; but until the Spanish took pos-
session of Louisiana under the cession of 1762, the Custom of
Paris continued to be the basic private law of the colony, modi-
fied slightly from time to time by royal ordinances.'
.,The judicial system of Louisiana -may be said to have been
founded during the Crozat administration, with the establish-
ment of the Superior Council and the first court of the territory.2
The procedure employed in civil cases in the Superior Council of
the colony was based primarily upon the four titles of the Custom
of Paris relating to real actions, actions generally, arrests and
.1. For interesting accounts of this period of the legal. history of Louisiana, see
Henry P. Dart, Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 LA. BAR ASS'N REP.
17 (1921), 4 LA. HIST. Q. 255. (1922); Wigmore; Louisiana: The Siory of Its
Legal Systetn, 1 So. L.Q. 1 (1916).
* :2. Henry P. Dart, Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 LA. BAR Ass'N
REP. 17, 25 (1921), 4 LA. HIST. Q. 255, 265 (1922).
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executions, and the seizure and sale of movables.3 Otherwise, the
procedure applicable was that employed in cases before the
Chatelet of Paris. From an examination of Pigeau's work on
the subject,4 it appears that the procedure of the Chatelet was
based largely upon the Ordonnance Civile of 1667, Louis XIV's
famed procedural code, generally regarded as the foundation of
the present French Code of Civil Procedure.
Few lawyers were to be found in the colony at this time, and
little litigation occurred during this period of French dominion.
This procedural system thus failed to make any lasting impres-
sion upon the small population, with the result that French civil
procedure played a relatively minor initial role in shaping the
adjective law of Louisiana.
Under the secret Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762, France
ceded the entire Louisiana territory to Spain. The latter's initial
attempt, under the timid de Ulloa, to take possession of the col-
ony three years later resulted in resistance from the French
colonists, which permitted Louisiana to remain under the de
facto control of the French commander until 1769. In that year,
Don Alejandro O'Reilly took possession of the territory with a
strong Spanish force, ruthlessly punished the leaders of the re-
sistance, and firmly established Spanish rule over the colony.
His first official acts were proclamations issued in the name of
His Most Catholic Majesty, abolishing the colonial government,
establishing the new Spanish Province of Louisiana, abrogating
French law in the colony, and establishing a short code of laws
for the people. This code" was intended only for temporary use,
and only until the colonists could become more familiar with the
laws of Spain.
The judicial system created under O'Reilly's Proclamation
consisted of regional trial courts throughout the territory under
Alcaldes Ordinary, with an appeal in petty cases to the Cabildo,
or municipal council of New Orleans, and in the more important
cases to the Audiencia in Havana, with the Council of the Indies
as the appellate court of last resort.
Annexed to the brief code embodied in O'Reilly's Proclama-
tion was a set of "instructions as to the manner of instituting
suits, civil and criminal, and of pronouncing judgments in gen-
3. See Titles 4, 5, 8, and 16, Coutfime de Paris.
4. PIOEAU, LA PROCADURE DU CHATELET DE PARIS (1787).
5.' See Ordinances and Instructions of Don Alexander O'Reilly, 1 LA. L.J., No.
2, p. 1 (1841).
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eral,"6 compiled by two of the Spanish lawyers on O'Reilly's
staff. The headnote thereon evidences the fact that both
O'Reilly's "code" and the instructions annexed thereto were
based upon the Recopilaci6n de las Indias, the great digest of the
laws and regulations enacted by Spain during the preceding cen-
turies for the people of their colonial empire, and the Recopila-
ci6n de Castilla. Both of these latter codes contained references
to the monumental C6digo de las Siete Partidas and the Nueva
Recopilaci6n de las Leyes de Espafia, as well as the earlier Span-
ish codifications, the Fuero Real, the Fuero Viejo de Castilla, and
even to the ancient Forum Juzgo. From the numerous citations
of these Spanish codes by the courts of Louisiana during the
initial period of American dominion, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that the colonial lawyers were completely familiar there-
with. The same evidence indicates that the works of Gregario
L6pez,T of Hevia Bolafios,8 and of Febrero9 likewise were avail-
able, and were accepted as authoritative in procedural matters
during the Spanish regime. Although Spain held the colony for
little more than a third of a century, its procedural law played an
extremely important role in shaping the subsequent civil "pro-
cedure of Louisiana. 10
Under the secret treaty of San Ildefonso in 1800, Spain retro-
ceded the Louisiana territory to France. The latter, however,
made no effort to regain possession of the colony until late in
1803. Prior to taking possession, France sold the entire territory
to the United States of America, which assumed control thereof
on December 20, 1803.
As -France exercised sovereignty over the colony in this
period for less than a month, no effort was made to abrogate
6. 1 LA. L.J., No. 2, p. 27 (1841).
7. LAs SInTE PARTIDAS glosadas por el Lie. Gregario L6pez.
8. Hevia Bolafilos, CURIA FUIPICA.
9. Febrero, LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBAN08.
10. Henry P. Dart, Civil Procedure in Louisiana under the Spanish Regime,
12 LA. HIST. Q. 33 (1929) ; Henry P. Dart, The Influence of the Ancient Law of
Spain in the Jurisprudence of Louisiana, 6 TUL. L. REV. 83 (1931), 18 A.B.A.J.
125 (1931) ; Henry P. Dart, The Law Library of a Louisiana Lawyer in the 18th
Century, 25 LA. BAR Ass'N REP. 12 (1924) ; Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana
Law, 6 TuL. L. REV. 280 (1932), 7 TUL. L. REV. 82 (1932), 8 TUL. L. REV. 896
(1934), and 9 TUL. L. REv. 244 (1935).
For detailed accounts of the legal history of Louisiana during the period of
Spanish dominion, the reader is referred to Wigmore, Louisiana: The Story oj Its
Legal System, 1 So. L.Q. 1 (1916) ; Henry P. Dart, The Colonial Legal Systems
of Arkansas, Louisiana and Texas, 12 A.B.A.J. 481 (1926); Henry P. Dart,
Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana, 22 LA. BAR AWS'N REP. 17 (1921), 4 LA.
HIST.. Q. 255 (1922) ; Henry P. Dart, The Place of Civil Law in Loaiislana, 4
TUL. L. REV. 163 (1930).
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the Spanish laws then in force. The American government, after
taking over the colony, moved slowly in effecting changes in the.
law of Louisiana. The former French colony was -first divided.
That portion north of the present northern boundary of the State!
of Louisiana was organized as the District, then the Territory,
of Louisiana, and finally as the Territory of Missouri. The re-,
mainder of the former colony, comprising all of the present State
of Louisiana except the West Florida Parishes, was organized as
the Territory of Orleans. Three acts of Congress of the United
States affecting the latter territory were passed during the first
two years after the Louisiana Purchase. The first"' left . un-
changed all of the laws then in force, simply vesting the adminis-
trative power in different officers. The second 12 and third13 of
these congressional acts reorganized the territorial government
to conform to the American pattern, provided for the writ of
habeas corpus and for trial by jury, but expressly declared that
all laws in force in the territory should continue in effect until
changed by subsequent legislation.
The Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans, empow-
ered by Congress to legislate for this new American possession,
made more significant changes almost immediately. The Crimes
Act of 180514 defined a large number of felonies and misdemean-
ors, repealed all prior criminal legislation, recognized the ac-
cused's right to a trial by jury, and provided *that all of such
trials should be conducted according to the common law of Eng-
land. The most important of these early territorial statutes, sub-
sequently known as the Practice Act of 1805,15 recognized the
Superior Court of the Territory, previously established in New
Orleans by the territorial governor, and provided a simple pro-
cedure'for the trial of cases therein. A third act 16 divided the
territory into counties, created county and justice of the peace
courts, and adopted a simplified version of the procedure em-
bodied in the Practice Act of 1805 for the trial of cases in these
courts.
The Practice Act of 1805 merits extended consideration here
for at-least two reasons. For one thing, it was the handiwork of
the distinguished Edward Livingston, who, ruined financially by
11. Act of October 31, 1803.
,12. Act of March 26, 1804.
13. Act of March 2, 1805.
14. Acts of the 'Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans of 1805, c. L.
15.Id. :c. XXVI. '
16. Id. c. XXV.
(Vol. XXI
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;the defalcations of a subordinate while holding the office of
Mayor of New York, emigrated to Louisiana to regain his for-
tune, subsequently became an enthusiastic convert to the civil
law, and led the fight for codification in Louisiana. For another,
important segments of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825
were taken bodily from the 1805 legislation.
The most radical changes made in the civil procedure of Lou-
isiana by the Practice Act of 1805 were the establishment of the
trial by jury, and the requirement that the testimony of all avail-
able witnesses be taken in open court, with depositions permitted
only for witnesses who were ill, aged, or beyond the control of
the court. Other provisions established a simplified form of
pleading, created the provisional remedies of attachment and
arrest, provided for the enforcement of judgments under the
writs of fieri facias and distringas, and authorized the court to
issue writs of quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus, and pro-
hibition. The statute went into great detail in prescribing the
form of citations, writs and other mandates to be issued by the
court. As Livingston was a staunch disciple of the great English
reformer, Jeremy Bentham, the simplified procedure embodied
in the Practice Act of 1805 reflected Bentham's influence.
Considerable difference of opinion exists today as to the
sources of this legislation. Mr. Benjamin Wall Dart, the dis-
tinguished editor of the last edition of the Louisiana Code of
Practice, and the son of Louisiana's leading legal historian, has
voiced the opinion that the provisions of the Practice Act of 1805
"'were in effect restatements of the Spanish procedure with addi-
tions made necessary by the new order resulting from France's
transfer of Louisiana to the United States."' 7 On the other hand,
America's most distinguished student of comparative civil pro-
cedure, the late Professor Robert Wyness Millar, of the North-
western University School of Law, was of the opinion that the
Practice Act of 1805 was primarily a refinement and simplifica-
tion of contemporary American chancery practice, 8 a view in
which the present writer originally concurred.' 9 Further re-
search by the writer over a period of years, however, has con-
vinced him that there is considerably more validity in Mr. Dart's
position than the writer had originally thought.
17. Benjamin W. Dart, Introduction, CODE OF PRACTICE OF THE STATE or LOU-
ISIANA V (2d ed. 1942).
* 18. Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 21 ILL. L. REV. 596, 604 (1937).




A determination of the primary sources of the Practice Act is
made extremely difficult by the very fact which, paradoxically
enough, appears to lend support to the views of both Mr. Dart
and Professor Millar: the striking similarity between many
aspects of Anglo-American chancery practice and Spanish pro-
cedure. This is not surprising, in view of the fact that the equity
system of England initially was administered by the ecclesiastics,
who applied the procedural principles of canonical procedure in
developing chancery practice. Since the adjective law of Spain
was also a legitimate descendant of Romano-canonical law, many
similarities of the two procedural systems are to be expected.
The present writer has been unable to find any recorded ex-
pression of the views of Edward Livingston on the subject.
Fairly convincing evidence is available, however, to indicate that
the. courts and legal profession of Louisiana regarded the Prac-
tice. Act of 1805 as being based primarily upon Spanish pro-
cedure.
The last section of this 1805 statute20 authorized the Superior
Court to issue writs of quo warranto, procedendo, mandamus,
and prohibition. The first year after the admission of Louisiana
to statehood, the newly created Supreme Court found it neces-
sary to determine whether the common law rules relating to man-
damus or the rules relating to its Spanish counterpart, incitativo,
were applicable in Louisiana. In determining this issue the court
observed.:
"The common law names in judicial proceedings have nat-
urally been adopted in a practice which is carried on in the
English language, but they ought to be considered rather as
a translation of the names formerly used, than as emanations
from the English jurisprudence; the words mandamus, pro-
cedendo, certiorari, prohibition, &c., sometimes employed in'
our practice, may be good equivalents for incitativo, evoca-
ci6n, inhibici6n, &c.; but their adoption as words can, by no
rule of law, or common sense, be considered as having intro-
duced the English practice itself.'" 21
This was the language of a court composed, not exclusively of
native Louisianians who might be expected to be unsympathetic
to any attempt to supersede the Spanish procedural rules with
20. Acts of the Legislative Council of the Territory of Orleans of 1805, c. XXV,
§22.
21. Agnes v. Judice, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 182, 185-86 (La. 1813).
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which they were familiar, but of a court having a majority of its
judges trained initially under the common law system. 22
A later case,23 although decided three years after the end of
the period which we are now considering, in answering a some-
what similar question, confirmed the judicial view quoted above.
In this later case, speaking through Justice Porter, the court
said:
"The repeal of laws is never presumed; and if the new
and old laws can stand together, they should be so construed.
It would be going far, to hold that the special enactment of a
remedy which previously existed, should introduce the con-
sequences that attended that remedy in another system of
jurisprudence. In this respect there is a material difference
between this case and that construction which should be given
to our laws introducing jury trial, and the writ of habeas
corpus; for they being unknown to our jurisprudence, the
understanding of them was ex necessitate, to be sought some-
where else. The use of common law terms is easily accounted
for, in the desire of the legislature to use those words which
would convey in the most clear and concise manner, to per-
sons acquainted with the English language alone, the reme-
dies defined. ' '24
Louisiana was admitted as a member state of the North
American union in 1812, under a constitution adopted earlier in
that year. Neither this constitution nor the statutes implement-
ing its provisions made any substantial changes in the procedural
law of Louisiana, other than the creation of a system of courts
based on the American pattern, and consisting of a supreme
court, district courts, and justice of the peace courts. The Prac-
tice Act of 1805 remained in effect until its repeal when the Code
of Practice went into effect in 1825.
The civil procedure of Louisiana at the end of this period,
therefore, was based primarily upon the Spanish procedure in
force during the period of Spanish dominion. Two significant
changes had been made therein by the Practice Act: the adoption
of the institution of jury trial; and the requirement that the
22. The Supreme Court of Louisiana on the date this case was decided was
composed of three judges only: Chief Justice Dominick A. Hall, and Associate
Justices George Mathews and Pierre Derbigny. Henry P. Dart, The History of
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 133 La. xxx, xxxix (1913).
23. Abat v. Whitman, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 162 (La. 1828).
24. Id. at 163-64.
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testimony of all available witnesses be given in open court. -The
common law rules of evidence followed in the wake of. the adop-
tion of the jury trial almost as a necessary consequence. 25 The
requirement of viva voce testimony in open court resulted in the
direct and cross-examination of witnesses as under the English
practice. As a result of these changes, the trial of litigation in
Louisiana, at least during this period, took on the complexion of
the common law trial. But otherwise, except to the extent that it
ran. counter to the provisions of the Practice Act and other legis-
lation, Spanish influence upon the civil procedure of the state
during this period remained paramount.
The Code of Practice of 1825
Pursuant to a legislative resolution of March 14, 1822, Li
Moreau Lislet, Edward Livingston, and Pierre Derbigny were
appointed as a committee to revise and amend the so-called Civil
Code of 1808, to prepare a commercial code,26 and to submit "a
treatise on the rules of civil actions and a system of the practice
to be observed before our courts. '27 No more able a group of
jurisconsults could have been selected for these tasks. Livings-
ton, who had come to Louisiana in 1804, probably was the most
distinguished American legal scholar of his day, entirely famil-
iar not only with the common law, but with Roman, French, and
Spanish law as well. Derbigny had been an outstanding prac-
titioner before the Spanish courts of the colony, one of the first
Justices of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, and subsequently
Secretary of State and Governor. Moreau Lislet, a distinguished
veteran of the colonial period, had previously served as Attorney
General of the state, and With Henry Carleton, had prepared the
first English translation of the Siete Partidas.
Early in 1823, the three redactors submitted to the Legisla-
ture the projet of the new procedural code, which was subse
quently approved and went into effect in 1825. This Code of
Practice, in form and arrangement, was typically civilian, con-
sisting of 1155 articles numbered consecutively, and divided into
25. See Planters' Bank v. George; 6 Mart.(O.S.) 670, 12 Am. Dec. 487 (La.
1819).
26. The projet of a commercial code, prepared by Livingston, was in due course
submitted to the legislature but never adopted. The resulting vacuum led to the
jurisprudential adoption of Anglo-American commercial law, subsequently adopted
as positive law through the enactment of a number of comprehensive statutes on
the various subjects thereof.
27. The legislative resolution is reprinted in Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana
Law, 6 TUL. L. REv. 280, 286-87 (1932).
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titles, chapters, and sections. As Colonel Tucker, the 'distin-'
guished President of the Louisiana State Law Institute, has
pointed out, it was "the product of a mixture of French, Spanish,
and Roman law elements, together with common law elements of
English origin. ' '2
8
The draftsmen of this procedural code, in the comments in
their projet,29 not only gave their reasons for the adoption of
controversial principles and procedural devices, but listed the
sources of the more important articles of the code. An examina-
tion of these source notes is extremely interesting. The direct
Roman law influence was slight, only eight references having
been made to the Digest and three to the Institutes, all in the
title dealing with actions. Spanish procedural law, as might be
expected, served as the basis of a number of extremely important
segments of the new codification, with sixty-three references to
the Spanish codes and procedure writers. There must be consid-
ered in this connection, however, the forty-five references to the
Practice Act of 1805 (the majority of which in turn were bot-
tomed upon Spanish procedure), and the sixty-nine references
to Louisiana statutes (a number of which were predicated on
general concepts of Spanish law). French procedural theory,
which had played a rather negligible role in the preceding era,
increased its influence upon the adoption of the Code of Practice.
Thirty references in the redactors' source notes were to works of
French commentators, with the more indirect influence reflected
through the twenty-six references to the Civil Code of 1808,
which was based largely upon the Code Napol6on.
The Spanish procedural law constituting direct sources of the
procedural code was drawn principally from the Siete Partidas,
and the procedural works of Febrero and Hevia Bolafos. The
writings of Domat and Pothier constituted the direct borrowings
from French pre-code procedural theory. Important segments of
Louisiana's procedural law, such as succession and injunction
procedure, reflected the indirect influence of French procedure.
One of the deficiencies of the redactors' source notes is that
very few references to Anglo-American law are listed, although
even a cursory examination of this code indicates quite clearly
that the Anglo-American contribution, though lesser than the
28. Tucker, Source Books of Louisiana Law, 7 TuL. L. REV. 82, 85 (1932).
29. The projets of the Code of Practice and Civil Code of 1825 have been offi-




Romanistic one, was considerable. Some idea of the relative
weight thereof can be gleaned from the brief analysis of Louisi-
ana's first procedural code which follows.
Procedural concepts and devices which reflect the primary
influence of Continental law include the code provisions relating
to actions generally; real actions; jurisdiction (ratione materiae
et personae) ; demands and incidental demands; cumulation of
actions; consolidation of actions; pleading (including the excep-
tions); the provisional remedies of arrest, sequestration, pro-
visional seizure, and injunction; interrogatories on facts and ar-
ticles; contestatio litis; real tenders; judgments; nullity and
rescission of judgments; ordinary, summary, and executory pro-
cedures; and succession procedure. The primary influence of
Anglo-American law was reflected in the code provisions relat-
ing to judicial administration (composition of courts, functions
of judicial officers, assignment and continuance of cases, et
cetera) ; the provisional remedy of attachment ;80 production of evi-
dence; trial of cases (including trial by jury) ; new trial; execu-
tion of judgments (particularly the enforcement of money judg-
ments) ; and the extraordinary remedies. Both systems of pro-
cedural law appear to have contributed to the code provisions re-
lating to citation and service of process, depositions, appellate
procedure, and proceedings before justice of the peace courts.
We have seen heretofore that, under the Practice Act of 1805,
the institution of jury trial had been adopted, and that this led
to the jurisprudential adoption of the common law rules of evi-
dence. Under the Anglo-American system, the appellate court
reviewed only questions of laVand ordinarily would not reverse
the jury verdict on factual issues. Under the Continental system,
the appellate court reviewed both legal and factual issues, as pre-
sented by the record. A compromise had been effected for the
Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans: the court reviewed
issues of law on appeal, and if any appellate review of factual
questions was desired, the case was completely retried by a new
jury selected in the appellate court. Very shortly after Louisi-
ana's admission to the Union, its Supreme Court held that, under
the Constitution of 1812, no retrial of a factual issue could be had
30. Attachment on mesne process, though not of common law, is of English
origin. For an interesting account of its development, its obsolescence in England,
and its general use throughout the American states, see MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE
OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 481-97 (1952).
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before a new jury.31 This was followed shortly by a decision3.
holding that the appellate court could review the transcript of
the evidence presented in the trial court, to determine the cor-
rectness of the jury's findings of fact. The principle of appellate
review of the facts thus adopted was repeatedly affirmed by the
court,33 and was confirmed in subsequent constitutions of the
state, at first impliedly, 34 and then expressly.3 5
The effects of these decisions, which did not make themselves
evident for some years, were to prove far-reaching. As the ap-
pellate courts were free to substitute their findings on factual
issues of the trial jury's verdict, and not infrequently did so,
jury trials in civil cases ultimately were had with relative in-
frequence. As a result, the technique of applying the common
law rules of evidence completely changed in the vast majority of
civil cases. Instead of being used to determine the admissibility
of evidence sought to be presented to the lay jury, they were now
used by the trial judge, skilled through experience in the mar-
shaling and evaluation of testimony, to weigh evidence, usually
admitted subject to the objections urged. In the area of the trial,
Continental procedure had regained much of the ground pre-
viously lost to Anglo-American procedure, and had neutralized
much of the latter's earlier victory.
The influence of Anglo-American procedure, however, con-
tinued to increase during this period, as a reading knowledge of
Spanish and French grew rarer in the profession, and Anglo-
American legal literature became increasingly available. Mem-
bers of the Louisiana Bench and Bar began to turn to English
and American precedents in the solution of procedural problems
really calling for the application of.the principles of Continental
civil procedure. Not a great deal of damage was done thereby,
31. Syndics of Brooks v. Weyman, 3 Mart.(O.S.) 9 (La. 1813).
32. Abat v. Doliolle, 4 Mart.(O.S.) 316 (La. 1816).
33. In Martineau v. Hooper, 8 Mart.(O.S.) 699 (La. 1820) ; Mitchel v. Jewel,
10 Mart.(O.S.) 645 (La. 1822) ; Morris v. Hatch, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 491 (La. 1824).
See also Scott v. Turnbull, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 335 (La. 1821); Dunn & Wife v.
Duncan's Heirs, 10 Mart.(O.S.) 671 (La. 1822) ; La Pointe v. Guidry, 7 La. 246
(1834) ; Montgomery v. Russell, 10 La. 330 (1836) ; Williams v. Lanier, 14 La.
210 (1839) ; Hood v. McCorkle, 16 La. 240 (1840); Nott & Co. v. Kirkman, 19
La. 14 (1841).
The subject is discussed in an interesting manner in Brumfield, Louisiasa
Practice- Trial De Nova on Appeal, PROCEED. OF N.A.C.C.A. 560 (1951).
34. LA. CONST. art. 63 (1845) ; LA. CONST. art. 62 (1852); LA. CONST. art.
70 (1864) ; LA. CONST. art. 74 (1868).
35. LA. CONST. art. 81 (1879) ; LA. CONST. art. 85 (1898) -LA. CONST. arts.,
85, 95 (1913) ; LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29 (1921). .
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but this interstitial seepage subsequently was to pave the way
for an increased reception of Anglo-American procedural law.
The Code of Practice of 1870
The purpose of the revision of Louisiana's two codes follow-
ing the Civil War were the elimination of all references therein
to the institution of slavery, and the incorporation therein of
all related special procedural legislation adopted since 1825. The
Code of Practice of 1870 went no further than this, and did little
to change the civil procedure of Louisiana.
The Period 1870-1960
Important changes of procedure were brought about during
the early years of this period. The former judicial view that
common law terms in the procedural code and statutes were to
be regarded merely as translations of the names of their Con-
tinental counterparts 6 now yielded to an excessively generous
appraisal of the commol law contribution to the procedure of
the state,3 7 and increased resort to the legal compendia then
being published in America.
Somewhat later, the American code procedure movement,
which was ushered in by New York's adoption of the David
Dudley Field Code of Procedure in 1848, and which spread like
wildfire throughout America during this period, had much to do
in extending the influence of Anglo-American procedure over
Louisiana practice. Paradoxically enough, the initial flow of in-
fluence was thus reversed, for it was the Louisiana Code of Prac-
tice of 1825 which provided the inspiration for the Field Code,
and "from it very many of the best portions of the Field Code
were adopted." 38 During this period, the current reversed its
direction.
The Field Code, figuratively speaking, was a protest against
the complexities and technicalities of contemporary Anglo-
American procedure. It unified common law procedure and:
chancery practice as far as was then practicable, and it sought
36. Agnes v. Judice, 3 Mart.(O.S.) 182 (La. 1813); Abat v. Whitman, 7
Mart.(N.S.) 162 (La. 1828).
37. See, for instance, Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897
(1907), and the writer's criticisms thereof in The Joinder of Partie8 in Louisiana,
19 LouIiANA LAw REVIEW 1, 5-9 (1959).
38. Report of Committee on Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law,
19 A.B.A. REP. 411, 427 (1896), 54 ALBxy L.J. 198, 204 (1896) ; CLARK, CODE
PLEADING 28, n. 70 (2d ed. 1947).
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to eliminate unnecessary technicalities and to simplify procedure.
But it was a procedural system designed to implement Anglo-
American law, and consequently was an Anglo-American code;
and it, and its offspring in the various American states, had to
be interpreted and applied largely by lawyers and judges whose
mental processes were molded by the "inexorable logic" of com-
mon law procedure, and who were still dominated by the pro-
cedural philosophy of the old system. Considering the back-
ground of these American procedure codes, cases interpreting
their provisions should never have been accepted by the Lou-
isiana courts in the solution of the procedural problems of
Louisiana; but unfortunately they were.
The system of pleading developed by these American codes
was intended to require brief, simple statements of the controll-
ing facts on which each litigant's position was based. As ulti-
mately developed by judicial interpretation, there evolved a
system of pleading rules almost as technical as the common law,
rules which they displaced. No lessening of the importance of
the role played by pleading in Anglo-American procedure re,
sulted from the adoption of American code pleading. In the
present writer's opinion, the Louisiana courts adopted the system
of "fact pleading" of the American codes shortly after the turn
of the present century, through acceptance of the judicial deci-
sions of the various American states on the subject, and froze it
into our system somewhat later through the adoption of the
Pleading and Practice Act. The original simplicity of the system
of pleading in the Louisiana Code of Practice gradually ossified
into a harsher and more technical system, with penalties for a
breach of what actually were rules of judicial etiquette ranging
from time-consuming amendments of the pleadings to the more
drastic dismissal of the suit. This system of pleading obtains
today in Louisiana, although its rigors have been tempered ap-
preciably in recent years through the commendably liberal atti-
tude of the Louisiana courts, 39 and the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure has further liberalized the system by both authorizing
and encouraging amendment at every stage of the proceeding.
At just about the same time that the rules of fact pleading
were received in Louisiana, the common law rules of joinder of
39. On this subject, the reader is referred to the article on The Case Against
Fact Pleading in Louisiana, 13 LOuiSIANA LAW REviEw 369 (1953). The opposing
view is presented in Tucker, Proposal for Retention of the Louisiana System of
Fact Pleading: Ewposd des Motifs, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 395 (1953).
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parties effected a partial entry into the jurisprudence of the
state. The provisions of the Codes of Practice relating to cumu-
lation of actions, taken directly from Spanish procedure, as the
redactors' source notes indicate, contained no requirement of con-
nexity with respect to subjective cumulation (litisconsortium).
The early Louisiana jurisprudence had solved the problem
through the jurisprudential adoption of the requirement of a
common interest, or community of interest, between the plain-
tiffs joining, or the defendant joined, in the suit - substantially
the same concept as the "community of jural interest" of the
German Code of Civil Procedure. 40 In 1909, objection was raised
by the defendant in a case to the union of actions by a plurality
of plaintiffs. 4' The result reached by the court was completely
sound, and thoroughly harmonious both with the earlier juris-
prudence of the state and with generally accepted Continental
principles of subjective cumulation. However, three gratuitious
and erroneous observations were voiced in the opinion,, to the
effect that: (1) Spanish and French procedure had no rules
which would afford any solution of the problem present; (2)
the early Louisiana jurisprudential rules on the subject were
derived from Anglo-American procedure; and (3) a resort
should be made "to the books of the common law" for aid in the
solution of related problems. 42 Since the only non-Louisiana au-
thorities cited in this opinion were equity precedents applying
the negative test of multifariousness, derived from the same
Romano-canonical principles which constitute the source of Con-
tinental rules of cumulation of actions, it seems clear that the
court did not intend to invite a resort to the applicable common
law rules, but rather to the pertinent rules of chancery practice.
Subsequent cases, 43 however, misconstrued the quoted language
as vouching for the acceptability in Louisiana of the common
law rules of joinder of parties, which were designed to imple-
ment the substantive rules of the common law joint, several,
and joint and several, obligations - concepts completely alien to
the civil law of Louisiana. Not too much damage was done
through the application of these common law procedural rules
in isolated cases. The alarming potential of these unfortunate
40. Art. 59.
41. Gill v. City of Lake Charles, 119 La. 17, 43 So. 897 (1907).
42. Ibid.
43. Dubuisson v. Long, 175 La. 564, 143 So. 494 (1932) ; Gates v. Bisso Ferry




decisions has now been removed through the Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure. 4
The adoption, since 1870, of a small number of procedural
statutes has further increased the content of Anglo-American
procedure in Louisiana practice. Limitations of space permit the
writer to refer only to the most important of these legislative
acts.
The code provisions relating to injunctions originally were
taken indirectly from French procedure, through the medium of
provisions of the so-called Civil Code of 1808. With the rapid
social and economic development in Louisiana, this injunction
procedure had proven inadequate, and even anachronistic. Con-
siderable improvement in the injunction practice had been made
in prior years in several American jurisdictions. The injunction
practice in the federal courts particularly had been improved
through the adoption of a statute drafted by an extremely able
congressional committee after an extended study of the subject.
In 1924, Louisiana adopted a statute45 regulating the issuance
of interlocutory injunctions, which was taken almost verbatim
from this federal statute. The adoption of this legislation, and
the gradual reception of equity principles relating to the issuance
of injunctions which occurred both before and after this enact-
ment, have resulted in an injunction procedure virtually of
Anglo-American origin.
II. THE LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
The new procedural code which has just been adopted, 46 and
which becomes effective on January 1, 1961, is the product of
ten years of painstaking work by the Louisiana State Law In-
stitute, the members of its council, the three reporters and their
research assistants, and the members of the Institute's advisory
and special committees. The Institute's organization for this
project, and the manner in which this work was done, has been
described in some detail in the Institute's Report to the Louisiana
Legislature which submitted the completed projet, and need not
be repeated here.
44. Arts. 461-465, 647.
45. La. Acts 1924, No. 29, now LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 3601-3613
(1960). For the reasons for the adoption of this legislation initially, see Spencer,
Discussion of Act 29 of 1924, Relating to Writs of Injunction, 26 LA. BAR ASS'N
REP. 15 (1925).




Except in the two respects mentioned later, the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure follows the conventional pattern of
structure and organization of codes of civilian jurisdictions. It
is divided into 9 books, 36 titles, 117 chapters, and 1029 articles.47
It departs from this conventional pattern, however, in two re-
spects- the numbering of the code articles, and the inclusion
of the redactors' comments in the code itself.
In lieu of the consecutive numbering of code articles from the
first to the last, the new code employs the split number system,
with all articles in a particular chapter or section numbered
consecutively, but with wide gaps between the number of the
last article in a particular chapter or section and the number of
the initial article in the next book, title, chapter, or section. This
system was adopted to permit the continuous revision of the new
code after adoption, by the inclusion in appropriate places
thereof of special procedural statutes adopted by the legislature
in the future.
The inclusion of the redactors' comments in the code itself is
a departure from traditional civilian redaction techniques, and
was adopted over the objections of a few of the old-school
civilians in Louisiana. This system was first employed by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, as an experiment, in the projet
of the Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942.48 The official comments
in the latter have proved so helpful to the courts and practicing
47. Book I is divided into three titles: Courts; Actions; and Parties. Book II,
containing the rules governing ordinary procedure, has six titles: Pleading; Cita-
tion and Service of Process; Production of Evidence; Pre-Trial Procedure; Trial;
and Judgments. Book III is divided into two titles: Appellate Procedure; and
Supervisory Procedure. Book IV, Execution of Judgments, has four titles: Gen-
eral Dispositions; Money Judgments; Judgments Other than Money Judgments;
and Foreign Judgments. Book V has two titles, on Summary Proceedings and
Executory Proceedings, respectively. Book VI, Probate Procedure, is divided into
six titles: General Dispositions; Acceptance of Successions Without Administra-
tion; Administration of Successions; Ancillary Probate Procedure; Small Succes-
sions; and Partition of Successions. Book VII, Special Proceedings, is divided into
eleven titles: Provisional Remedies (conservatory writs) ; Real Actions; Extra-
ordinary Remedies (habeas corpus, mandamus, and quo warranto) ; Annulment
of Marriage, Separation from Bed and Board, and Divorce; Judicial Emancipa-
tion; Tutorship; Administration of Minor's Property During Marriage of Parents;
Interdiction and Curatorship of Interdicts; Partition Between Co-Owners; Con-
cursus Proceedings; and Eviction of Tenants and Occupants. Book VIII, Trial
Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, makes uniform the procedure in justice of the peace
and city courts, and in the "clerk's book" cases in the district courts, so far as
constitutionally possible. It has three titles: General Dispositions; Cases Involv-
ing One Hundred Dollars or Less; and Cases Involving More than One Hundred
Dollars. Book IX has only two titles: Miscellaneous Provisions; and Definitions.
48. Adopted by La. Acts 1942, No. 43, § 1.
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lawyers of the state that there was a strong professional demand
for the employment of this technique in the projet of the new
.procedural code. Judicial precedent plays a more important role
in Louisiana than in any other civilian jurisdiction, and the
consideration of the prior jurisprudence was deemed helpful in
all cases. The citation of prior cases was absolutely necessary
in those instances where the jurisprudential rule was being re-
versed legislatively.
Objectives
Through the redaction of the Louisiana Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, the Louisiana State Law Institute sought to accomplish
the following objectives:
(1) The consolidation of all procedural rules relating gen-
erally to civil actions 'and proceedings. Prior to the adoption of
the new code, these rules were to be found in the Code of Prac-
tice, a large number of special statutes adopted since 1870, a
much larger number of judicial decisions, and in the Civil Code.
The latter contained large segments of our adjective law, in-
cluding the procedural rules relating to successions, tutorship,
judicial emancipation, interdiction, curatorship, annulment of
marriage, separation from bed and board, and divorce.
(2) The elimination of many Unnecessarily technical rules
and results which served more to defeat than to further the ends
of justice. A few of these were to be found in the positive law,
but manymore lurked in the prior decisions of the courts.
(3) The revision and reformation of those procedural de-
vices and concepts of some efficacy and workability, which could
be improved either through simplification or expansion, so as
to operate more efficiently under modern economic or social
conditions.
(4) The borrowing of some of the newer and more effective
procedural devices in Anglo-American and Continental procedure
which could be assimilated by and integrated into our adjective
law.
(5) The granting of more power, authority, and discretion
to the trial judge. The shackling of the trial judge in the United
States during the past century and a quarter was largely a result
of the influence of Jacksonian democracy, which was distrustful
of the judiciary and sought to control procedural decisions
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through the adoption of minute and rigid statutory rules. The
Code of Practice, largely the handiwork of Edward Livingston,
one of the leaders of this school of political thought, hamstrung
the trial judge unnecessarily in many respects. Here, the new
code has adopted the approach of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in granting necessary power, authority, and discretion
to the trial judge.
(6) The statement of procedural rules in clear, simple Eng-
ish. The Code of Practice of 1825 was drafted in French, with
the English version an imperfect translation. The revision of
1870 left the latter as the only official version, but did nothing
to remove its many awkward and cumbersome phrases. The pro-
cedural statutes adopted since 1870, most of which were replete
with hackneyed legal terms and expressions which obscured their
meaning, had further aggravated this unfortunate situation.
Redaction Policies
For nearly a century and a half the civil procedure of Lou-
isiana has been a blend, or synthesis, of Continental and Anglo-
American civil procedures. One of the initial decisions of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, when it commenced work on the
new procedural codification, was that there would be no dis-
carding of the basic Louisiana procedure to accept a new system
based upon either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the
procedural code of another American state.
The pragmatic justification of comparative law is the oppor-
tunity afforded for the improvement and enrichment of one legal
system through the intelligent borrowing of more effective con-
cepts and principles from other systems. The comparative
method was utilized throughout the redaction of the new code.
The latter contains some procedural devices and concepts bor-
rowed from the latest and most advanced Anglo-American "codi-
fication"-the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These, however,
have largely been in replacement of Louisiana counterparts of
Anglo-American origin. Less extensive borrowings have been
made from modern Continental procedural systems, and these
largely in replacement of Louisiana analogues of Continental
origin. As each procedural device and concept was considered by
the Law Institute, it was compared carefully with its Continental
and Anglo-American counterparts. If any of the latter clearly
proved more useful-and more workable, it was borrowed and
(Vol. XXI
LEGISLATIVE SYMPOSIUM
incorporated into the new code. In some instances where no
actual borrowing resulted, the comparison indicated the desir-
ability of a more precise or clearer statement of the Louisiana
rule which was to be retained.
Throughout the work of the redaction of the new code the
Louisiana State Law Institute followed one cardinal policy: there
should be no change for the mere sake of change. No matter how
appealingly novel or intriguing the suggestion, no matter what
its theoretical appeal, no change was made except upon con-
vincing evidence that it would prove more useful and workable
than its Louisiana counterpart. The result is that no radical or
revolutionary changes were made in the civil procedure of the
state through the adoption of the new code.
Procedural Philosophy
Every codification reflects, in large measure, the legal
philosophy of its redactors. The procedural philosophy of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure is essentially pragmatic.
While recognizing the need for symmetry and the correlation of
the articles of this code, in its redaction the Louisiana State Law
Institute was more concerned with the utility and workability of
the procedural rules embodied therein than with any "science of
civil procedure." The Code of Practice of 1825 provided an
excellent base for an affective administration of civil justice in
Louisiana, but for roughly half of the one hundred and thirty-
five years which have elapsed since its adoption, its spirit was
overlooked by both the legislatures and the courts of the state.
During this period, both of the latter were largely under the
influence of the procedural philosophy of Anglo-American law,
which then regarded a lawsuit as a duel between skilled pro-
tagonists. Both shook off this influence more than a quarter of
a century ago, but many legislative and jurisprudential rule over-
turned by the new code reflected this misconception of the func-
tion of procedure. The new code embodies procedural rules de-
signed to permit the trial of a case to serve as a search for the
truth, and to have its decision based on the substantive law ap-
plicable, rather than upon technical rules of procedure.
•The procedural philosophy of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure is summed up by the language of its Article 5051:
"The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally, and with,
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due regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the
-substantive law and are not an end in themselves."
III. MORE IMPORTANT CHANGES MADE BY PROCEDURAL REVISION
t. As indicated in-the title of the act adopting the new code,49
the latter consolidates all of the procedural rules generally ap-
plicable to civil actions and proceedings. Hence, it includes those
procedural statutes now incorporated in Titles 9 and 13 of the
Revised Statutes, and the procedural rules in the Civil Code re-
lating to successions, tutorship, interdiction, curatorship of inter-
dicts, judicial emancipation, annulment of marriage, separation
trom bed ,and board, and divorce. The companion legislation to
implement the adoption of the new code"0 repeals or amends a
number of code or statutory provisions which have either been
transferred in whole or in part to the new procedural code, or
which are inconsistent therewith and must be amended to cor-
relate with the new procedural rules.
The most radical changes proposed by the Louisiana State
Law Institute in the redaction of this code were with respect to
Depositions and Discovery, Pre-Trial Procedure, and Third Party
Practice, all borrowed from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
These changes were adopted by the Louisiana Legislature in
195251 and 1954,5 2 and appear to have worked well since their
adoption. By comparison, none of the other changes embodied
in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure appear anywhere near
as far-reaching. The new code incorporates a large number of
rules not heretofore recognized by code or statutory provisions,
but the great majority of these are merely declaratory of existing
jurisprudence and make no change in the law. Some existing
49. La. Acts 1960, No. 15.
50. La. Acts 1960, No. 30, amending the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana; La.
Acts 1960, No. 31, amending Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950;
La. Acts No. 32, amending Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950;
La. Acts 1960, No. 33, amending LA. R.S. 32:710(K) (1950); La. Acts 1960, No.
34, adopting a new LA. R.S. 43:203 (1950) ; and La. Acts 1960, No. 35, amending
LA. R.S. 47:2413(B) (1950).
51. La. Acts 1952, No. 202, § 1, incorporated Depositions and Discovery into
Title 13 of the-Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 as Sections 3741 through 3794
thereof. These provisions have been transferred into the new Code as Articles 1421
through 1515 thereof., La. Acts 1952, No. 84, § 1, incorporated Pre-Trial Procedure
into Title 13 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 as Section 5151 thereof.
This statutory provision is incorporated in the Code of Civil Procedure as Article
1551 thereof.52. La. Acts 1954, No. 433, § 1, incorporated Third Party Practice into Title 13
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 as Sections 3381 through 3386 thereof.
These statutory provisions have been transferred into the new Code as Articles
1111 through 1116 thereof.
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jurisprudential rules are overruled legislatively, but it is believed
that nearly all lawyers will agree that these were unduly tech-
nical or unworkable, and should have been discarded.
The more important changes in the procedural law made by
the adoption of the new code, and which are of general and im-
mediate interest to all members of the profession, are sum-
wiarized below. This summary will include consideration of the
few new statutory provisions which likewise make changes of
some importance in the procedural law.
Courts
An important theoretical change is made in the title on
Courts,53 in discarding the concepts of jurisdiction ratione ma-
teriae et personae - based upon the competence ratione materiae
et personae of French procedure - to accept completely and,
exclusively the Anglo-American concepts of jurisdiction and
venue. Actually, this theoretical change is not as radical as may
appear at first blush. The Anglo-American concepts of juris-
diction over the person, over property, and over status were
brought into our law years ago by the constitutional require-
ments of full faith and credit, and due process of law. The term
v"'enue" is -no newcomer to the civil procedure of Louisiana,
since it has been used in our corporation, and some of our insur-
ance, statutes -for years. "Jurisdiction over subject matter" is
the exact equivalent of jurisdiction ratione materiae. The changes
made in this title really are terminological; and were made to
eliminate difficulties which our courts have experienced in the
past, in confusing jurisdiction ratione materiae with jurisdiction
V'atione personae, and the latter with jurisdiction over the
person.
The extremely important article on jurisdiction over the
person54 does not, and was not intended to, exercise the full
potential of jurisdiction over nonresidents opened up by recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 5 It'was intended
to serve as the theoretical base for the requirements of service
of process, or general appearance, for a valid personal judg-
53. By Arts. 1-,10, 41.
54. Art. 6.
55. Particularly by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) ; and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
These two cases swept: aside all of. the former theories of. "consent," "presence,"
and, 'doing business" which theretofore had retarded development of the procedural
law in this area. . . . . ..... .. : .
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ment; and was purposely phrased very broadly so as not to limit
the validity of any particular type of service of process. Future
developments in the latter area were to be left to special legis-
lation. An amendment of a section of the Revised Statutes made
by one of the implementing statutes" appreciably broadens
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Exercise of the full juris-
dictional potential over nonresident individuals, and possibly
over nonresident partnerships and unincorporated associations
as well, in the past has been limited to some extent by constitu-
tional prohibitions ;57 but it is believed that the recent case of
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co."' has now opened up
the avenue of service by registered mail in cases where a non-
resident individual, partnership, or unincorporated association
has either done business in Louisiana, or has entered into a con-
tract to be performed in this state. It is hoped that the Louisiana
State Law Institute will draft the necessary legislation to ac-
complish this within the next two years.
The article on general appearance, 59 which has been needed
for years, makes a slight change in the procedural law by pro-
viding that a motion for an extension of time to plead does not
submit the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Another
slight change is made in the article on jurisdiction over status,e
which recognizes the jurisdiction of Louisiana courts to interdict
a Louisiana domiciliary who is being treated in an institution in
another state.
56. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1, amending and re-enacting LA. R.S. 13:3471
(1950). The first subsection of the amended section amends the former LA. R..
13:3471(5) (d) by substituting the language "a business activity in this state,
service of process in an action or proceeding on a cause of action resulting from
such business activity" for the more limited language of the former provision
"business activities in this state, through acts done by its employees or agents,
service of process in an action or proceeding on a cause of action resulting from
or relating to such acts done," etc. The dual purposes of this amendment were:
(1) to exercise the full potential of jurisdiction, insofar as foreign corporations
are concerned, permitted by International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945) and McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) ; and
(2) to overrule legislatively Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co., 71 So.2d 613
(La. App. 1954) and the cases relied on therein.
. 57. See Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). But cf. Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). Both the Nonresident Motorist Act, LA. &.S.
13:3474, 3475 (1950), and the Nonresident Watercraft Owners Act, LA. U.S.
13:3479-3482 (1950) have been held constitutional. -Roper v. Brooks, 201 La. 135,
9 So.2d 485 (1942) ; and Tardiff v. Bank Line, 127 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. La. 1954),
15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 832 (1954).
58. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
59. Art. 7.
60. Art. 10(3). This change was made to avoid a judicial vacuum. The courts
of some states limit their jurisdiction over incompetency proceedings to. domicil-
laries of their own state.
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. The chapter on Venue clarifies the rules on this subject,
heretofore fouled up by both the legislature and the courts, with-
out making any great change in actual results. The difficulties
caused by the "mandatory language" and the "permissive lan-
guage" of the various provisions of the Code of Practice is
eliminated through an article in the new code which spells out
certain priorities and otherwise allows the plaintiff to select any
venue provided by any applicable article. 61 The venue of suits
on insurance policies, other than life and health and accident
policies, is broadened somewhat . 2
The rules on the recusation of judges are changed in only
two slight, and not particularly important, respects. 63
The chapter on the power and authority of courts is largely
declaratory of the prior code and statutory provisions. An ap-
preciable amount of research time for both lawyers and judges
will be saved, and some doubt and uncertainty removed, through
the articles in the new code which specifically enumerate the
judicial acts which may be performed, and the orders and judg-
ments which may be signed, in chambers 64 and in vacation.6
The heretofore fuzzy area of contempt of court is clarified by
articles which define the various contempts, and provide the
procedure for trial and punishment thereof.66
The duties, powers, and authority of clerks of the various
courts are regulated by articles which make no real change from
the prior code and statutory provisions. The judicial and quasi-
judicial powers of the clerks of the district courts (Orleans
Parish excepted)' are recognized by applicable articles, 67 but are
broadened slightly to permit such a clerk to sign more ex parte
and perfunctory orders than he could before.
- 61. Art. 45.
-62. Any action may be brought thereon "in the parish where-the los occurred
or the insured is domiciled." Art. 76.
Nothing in the Code modifies or affects the venue provided in the Direct Action
Statute, LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950).
63. Under Art. 152, on "the written application of a district judge, the Supreme
Court may recuse him for any reason which it considers sufficient." This was
done to permit recusation in any justifiable case of embarrassment not listed spe-
cifically as a ground therefor. LA. R.S. 13:101 (1950), which allowed a recused
Supreme Court Justice to select the judge to replace him, is repealed by La.-Acts
1960, No. 32, § 2.
64. Arts. 194, 195.
65. Art. 196.
66. Arts. 221-227. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6, adopts a new LA. R.S. 13:4611
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The duties, powers, and authority of the sheriff in civil
matters, the subject of so many repetitious articles in the Code
of Practice, are covered concisely by fourteen articles in the
chapter on the subject.68 For the most part, these articles are
declaratory of prior code and statutory rules; but two very im-
portant changes are made. Heretofore, the sheriff had the power
of administration over seized property only when the seizure
was made under a writ of sequestration, fieri facias, or seizure
and sale; and his authority to continue the operation of a seized
business was extremely doubtful. Under the new code, the sheriff
has the power of administration of property seized under any
type of writ.6 9 'He may continue the operation of any business,
farm, or plantation under seizure; and must do so when suf-
ficient funds therefor are advanced by any interested person.70
Actions
This title is largely declaratory of the prior procedural rules,
but one rather important change is made in this area by the
procedural revision.
This -change relates to abatement of actions. After months
of groping for effective solutions of the various problems in
this area, the Law Institute concluded that no effective solutions
were possible without an amendment of Article 2315 of the
Civil Code. After months of study by a special committee, the
latter submitted specific recommendations for such an amend&
ment, which were approved with very slight changes. One of the
implementing acts7' effects this amendment. Under it, Article
2315 of the Civil Code is changed in four important respects:
(1) the right to recover property damage caused by a wrongful
act is recognized as a property right which is inherited by the
obligee's heirs if he dies before suit or recovery; (2) the right
to recover all other damages caused by a wrongful act, including
those for wrongful death, on the death of the injured person is
transmitted to designated beneficiaries, who may also recover
their individual damages, as under the prior law; . (3) the pri-
mary class of these beneficiaries is broadened to include major
children,: as well as the surviving spouse and minor children;
and (4) the transmitted and individual rights of a'. designated
* 68., Arts. 321-34.
69, Art. 328.
70. Ibid.
71. La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
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beneficiary are recognized as property rights which, on his death
either before judgment or even before the filing of suit, are
inherited by the heirs of this beneficiary.72 With these changes
the remaining problems of abatement of actions are solved simply
through a basic article73 providing that no actions abate on the
death of a party, except those to enforce a right or obligation
strictly personal.
Mention should be made of the articles in the new code on
the subject of cumulation of actions, 74 which are much clearer
and more explicit than those of the Code of Practice. These,
however, make no change in procedural theory and few changes
in results. They are made more explicit to retain the original
simplicity of the rules on cumulation of actions; and to prevent
the further application of Anglo-American rules on the subjects
of joinder of actions and of parties, which are based on substan-
tive concepts completely alien to the civil law of Louisiana, and
which in the past have done some damage and threatened even
more to our civil procedure.7 5 The articles in the new code bring
the "misjoinder of parties" clearly within their application, and
spell out the requirement of community of interest heretofore
recognized by the jurisprudence.7 6 Two conflicting lines of cases
in the past prescribed different penalties for a misjoinder of
parties: in the greater number of cases the suits were dismissed,
while in some decisions the plaintiff was required to elect.77
Under the new code, the trial court may: (1) require the plain-
tiff to elect; or (2) simply order separate trials of the actions
improperly joined . 7  The trial court may also order separate
trials of cumulated actions, when it feels that it would be dif-
ficult to try them together, when the defendant has failed to
object to the improper joinder, or even when the joinder is
theoretically proper.7 9
The new code borrows the language of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure regulating the procedure of the true class ac-
72. This amendment overrules legislatively Chivers v. Roger, 50 La. Ann. 57,
23 So. 100 (1898) ; Kerner v. Trans-Mississippi Terminal R. Co., 158 La. 853, 104
So. 740 (1925) ; and all subsequent cases based thereon.
73. Art. 428.
74. Arts. 461-465. See also Art. 647.
75. On this point see The Joinder of Parties in Louisiana, 19 LOUISIANA LAW
REviEw 1, 5-9 (1959).
76. Arts. 461, 463, 647.
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tion ;80 but, as the Louisiana cases cited in the comments show,
the new articles merely state with greater precision the rules
previously recognized in the jurisprudence.
Parties
The title on Parties constitutes a definite improvement of
our procedural law, but not too many changes are made therein.
The chapter on Joinder provides needed rules for the heretofore
blurred area of indispensable and necessary parties,8 ' but ac-
tually makes only one rather unimportant change in the law.8
The chapters on Parties Plaintiff and Parties Defendant con-
solidate all of the rules on these subjects which heretofore were
to be found scattered about in the Code of Practice, the Civil
Code, the Revised Statutes, and in the jurisprudence. The great
majority of these articles enunciate rules which are identical
with those under the prior law, but a few very important changes
are made. To remove the prior conflict in the case law, the new
code provides that the succession representative alone is the
proper plaintiff to enforce the rights of a succession, and the
proper defendant against whom the obligations of a succession
should be enforced, as long as it is under administration, re-
gardless of the type of action. 83 The rocks on which many a
suit has foundered - whether a right sought to be enforced by,
or an obligation sought to be enforced against, a married woman
belongs to or is owed by her paraphernal estate or by the com-
80. Arts. 591-597. The hybrid and spurious class actions are merely permissive
joinder devices which are needed to broaden, under the theory of ancillary juris-
diction, the sharply restricted jurisdiction of federal courts. They are not at all
necessary in the procedure of state courts, which are not limited to cases involving
a federal question of diversity or citizenship. For this reason, they were not
adopted by the new code. See Comment (c) of Art. 591.
81. Arts. 641-647.
82. Under the prior law, one of a number of joint obligees or obligors might
sue or be sued alone. Under the new code, all joint obligees or obligors are neces-
sary parties, who must join or be joined when timely objection to the nonjoinder
Is made by a defendant. Arts. 643-645. This was done to discourage multiplicity
of'litigation. As under the prior law, "One or more solidary obligees may sue to
enforce a solidary right, and one or more solidary debtors may be sued to enforce
a solidary obligation, without the necessity of joining all others in the action."
Art. 643.
83. Arts. 685, 734. While the general rule is that a personal representative
of a decedent, appointed or confirmed by a court of another state, may not sue in
Louisiana without being appointed the ancillary succession representative by a
Louisiana court, Arts. 685, 3403, an exception was made for wrongful death
actions. An administrator or executor appointed or confirmed by a court of another
state, and in whom a right to recover damages for wrongful death vests, is per-
mitted to sue in a Louisiana court without qualifying as ancillary administrator
or executor. LA. R.S. 13:3331 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6. See
Comment (a) of Art. 3403.
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munity of acquits and gains - are removed under the new code.
Suit in the alternative by, or against, the wife and her husband
is expressly permitted.8 4 As under the prior law, a partnership
is recognized as a legal entity; but while heretofore it had to
appear through and be represented by all of its partners, under
the new code it may appear through and be represented by any
authorized partner.8 5 Unincorporated associations may sue and
be sued under the new code.8 The technical differences between
the procedural rules relating to the enforcement of the rights of a
foreign corporation in equity receivership, and those of one in
a statutory receivership, are removed under the new code. An
ancillary receiver must be appointed for both by a Louisiana
court, and he is the proper plaintiff in both cases.8 7
The new code has a complete set of rules on the substitution
of parties,8 modeled upon the applicable provisions of the pres-
ent Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Pleading
Despite some rumors to the contrary, the new code retains
the present system of fact pleading,8 9 but tempers it to a con-
siderable extent by an article authorizing and encouraging the
ready amendment of pleadings.90 Several slight changes are
made in the formal requisites of all pleadings. The salutation,
or address to the court, is eliminated as unnecessary, but there
is a requirement that all pleadings have a caption.91 Verifying
affidavits are no longer required, except for petitions for pro-
visional remedies (conservatory writs) .92 Neither a certificate
of the filing of an exception in good faith, nor a verifying affi-
davit of the truthfulness of facts alleged therein, are required
under the new code. In lieu of both certificate and verifying
affidavit, the new code requires each pleading to be signed by at
84. Arts. 686, 735.
85. Art. 688. This was done because of the increasing number of partnerships
with a very large number of partners, but which have a resident managing partner
with plenary authority to institute suit to enforce the rights of the partnership.
86. Arts. 689, 738.
87. Art. 692. See Comment (c) thereof.
88. Arts. 801-807.
89. Arts. 854, 891, 1003.
90. Art. 1154.
91. "Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth the name of the
court, the title and number of the action, and a designation of the pleading. The
title of the action shall state the name of the first party on each side with an
appropriate indication of other parties." Art. 853.
92. Verifying affidavits are still required in petitions for an attachment, se-
questration, or injunction. Arts. 3501, 3603.
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least one attorney of record, and this signature "constitutes a
certificate by, him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground
to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay." 93
Aside from those just noted, there are no changes with re-
spect to the rules governing the petition.
The rules regulating the exceptions have been simplified ap-
preciably by a few simple, but quite important, changes. The
present thirty-odd nominate exceptions are reduced to three:
the declinatory exception, the dilatory exception, and the per-
emptory exception. 4 The workability of the new system appears
to be guaranteed by articles which enumerate specifically the
objections which may be urged through each exception. 5 Each
exception is required to "state with particularity the objections
urged and the grounds thereof.""" The prior "sacred order" of
pleading the various declinatory exceptions (now objections) is
completely eliminated through the provisons that "When two
or more of [the specific] objections are pleaded in the declina-
tory exception, they need not be pleaded in the alternative or in
any particular order. '0 7 As under the prior law, the declinatory
and dilatory exceptions must be pleaded at the same time; but
again the prior hypertechnical rules are eliminated through the
provision that "When filed at the same time or in the same
pleading, [the declinatory and dilatory] exceptions need not be
pleaded in the alternative or in a particular order."9' 8 If the
declinatory exception is sustained because the action is brought
in a court of improper jurisdiction or venue, the trial court may
now transfer the action to a proper court,99 instead of being
forced to dismiss it.
As under the Code of Practice, written motions are deemed
to be pleadings. The chapter in the new code on this subject
makes two important changes. The very useful motion to strike,
which was used in Louisiana for more than a century before it
93. Art. 863.
94. Art. 922.
95. The specific objections which may be pleaded through the declinatory, dila-





99. Art. 932. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1, amends LA. R.S. 13:3271-3276 (1950)




was abruptly abolished by the Supreme Court with the astonish-
ing explanation that it was not recognized under our system of
pleading, is restored.100 The other change is much more im-
portant: the motion for summary judgment is borrowed from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'0 ' This fills a long-felt need
in our procedural system.'0
2
Two changes, in addition to those mentioned initially, are
made with respect to the answer. The first and most important
is that the delay for answering under the new code is a flat
fifteen days, 103 instead of the prior ten days plus the distance
differential. As under the prior law, an extension of time to
plead may be granted by the trial court for good cause.'0 4 The
remaining change is not important enough to warrant textual
discussion 0 5
A number of important changes are made with respect to
the incidental demands. For one thing, the number thereof is
reduced from five to three, 06 through the merger of the demand
in compensation with the reconventional demand, 10 7 and the
fusion of the third opposition with the intervention. 08 Under
the prior law, exceptions might be filed, and answers were re-
quired, only to intervention and the third party demand (the
former call in warranty). Under the new code, exceptions may




102. The exception of no cause of action and the motion for judgment on the
pleadings are 'both useful procedural devices to be employed when the petition or
the answer fails to state an adequate cause of action, or a defense, as the case may
be. Neither may pierce sufficient but frivolous allegations. Frivolous actions or
defenses may be disposed of quickly through the motion for summary judgment,
without the necessity of awaiting a trial on the merits.
103. Art. 1001.
104. Ibid.
105. Under the present law, the pleading of inconsistent facts in the alterna-
tive (if within the knowledge of the pleader) is prohibited, but the alternative
pleading of inconsistent legal conclusions or inferences based on the same basic
facts is permitted. This subtle and nebulous difference has caused courts and at-
torneys to spin their wheels, and to waste more time than the results could pos-
sibly justify. Hence, the new code provides that an "answer may set forth two
or more defenses in the alternative, even though the factual or legal bases thereof
may be inconsistent or mutually exclusive. All allegations in such cases are made
subject to the obligations set forth in Article 863" (implied certificate of good




109. Arts. 1034, 1035.
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Other than those mentioned above, only one change has been
made with respect to the reconventional demand, but it is an
important one. Under the prior law, a reconventional demand
might have been filed only when it had connexity with the main
demand, or there was a diversity of residence between plaintiff
and defendant. Under the new code, any cause of action may be
asserted through the reconventional demand, regardless of con-
nexity or diversity of residence.110
The only change of great importance made with respect to
intervention is its broadening to absorb the present third opposi-
tion, 1' as mentioned above.
When the Law Institute drafted the articles governing the
third party demand (third party practice), these were included
in two different sections of the chapter in the projet on the
Incidental Demands: (1) in the general rules applicable to all
incidental demands; and (2) in the section applicable only to
the third party demand. In 1954, when the Third Party Practice
Act was enacted, the legislature adopted only the second set of
provisions, leaving a number of resulting hiatuses.112 The new
code, of course, fills in all of these hiatuses. 18 Another extremely
important change made in this area by the procedural revision
is the amendment of Article 2103 of the Civil Code by one of the
implementing acts,"-4 so as to permit the enforcement of con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors through the third party de-
mand." 5
Citation and Service of Process
The only important change made by this title is a clarifica-
110. Art. 1061.
111. Arts. 1092, 1093.
112. These former hiatuses were pointed out and discussed in Survey of 1954
Legislation -Courts and Judicial Procedure, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 38, 46-
49 (1954). See also Cameron v. Reserve Insurance Co., 237 La. 433, 111 So.2d
336 (1959), 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 432 (1960), which held that since the
Third Party Practice Act had no venue provisions, a third party defendant could
not be sued in the parish where the main demand was pending, unless he could
have been sued therein as an original defendant.
113. Arts. 1031-1040. The third party demand must be filed in the court where
the main demand is pending. Art. 1034.
114. La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 1.
115. Despite the adoption of the Third Party Practice Act, it had been held
that contribution among joint tortfeasors could not be enforced through the third
party demand, unless the third party defendant had been sued solidarily originally
with the third party plaintiff. It was held that substantively there was no right
to enforce contribution against a joint tortfeasor not sued by the plaintiff. Kahn
v. Urania Lumber Co., 103 So.2d 476 (La. App. 1958). LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2103




tion of the prior law. Under the former statutory provision re-
quiring service of all pleadings, and authorizing service by mail
or delivery of all pleadings not required to be served by the
sheriff, there was considerable confusion and uncertainty as to
when a pleading had to be served by the sheriff and when it
might be served by mail or delivery. The new code clarifies this
by limiting the instances in which pleadings may be served by
mail or delivery.116
A change made by one of the implementing acts1 7 makes it
possible to reduce the cost of services to be made at a distance
from the parish seat.11
Production of Evidence
Two extremely important changes in the law are made in the
title on this subject. Under the prior law, witnesess might be
subpoenaed to testify personally in civil cases only if they lived
in the parish or within one hundred miles of the place where
the court was held. Under the new code, any witness living or
present in the state may be subpoenaed to testify personally." 9
As under the prior law, a sufficient deposit must be made with
the clerk of the court to cover the fee, mileage, and expense
alowance of a witness living or present in another parish, before
a subpoena to him can be issued.12 0
The new code adopts the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law Act, which will permit a Louisiana court to take judicial
notice of the statutes and common law of another American
state.'21
No change is made with respect to depositions and discoveryi
116. Service by mail or delivery is limited to a "pleading which requires no
appearance or answer, or which under an express provision of law may be served
as provided in this article." Art. 1313. Cf. Arts. 1063, 1093.
117. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6, adds a new LA. R.S. 13:3484 (1950) which
effects the change.
118. The party desiring to have service made at a distance of more than 10
miles from the parish seat may request that the papers be mailed to a deputy
sheriff, constable, or marshal living in the vicinity where service is to be made.
When such a request is made, whether complied with or not, the sheriff may not
charge more than the cost of mailing the papers, and mileage for the actual distance
from the home or office of the deputy, constable, or marshal, and return. LA. R.S.
13:3484 (1950), as added by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6.
119. Art. 1352.
120. Art. 1352; LA. R.S. 13:3661 (1950), as amended and re-enacted by La.








Two rather important changes are made in the law by the
articles in this title of the new code. The prior rule that the
plaintiff might discontinue his action as of non-suit at any time
up to the moment it was submitted to the trial court had been
productive of hardship and injustice to many defendants. Under
the new code, plaintiff may dismiss his suit at any time, but the
trial court has discretion to determine whether this dismissal is
with or without prejudice. 12 3 Similarly, the rule that when a
plaintiff failed to appear at the trial the court could only non-
suit him is discarded by the new code. Here again, the trial court
is given discretion to determine whether the judgment of dis-
missal is with or without prejudice. 124
Students of civil procedure in other American states, and
some defense lawyers in Louisiana as well, will be more critical
of the articles on jury trial than of any other portion of the new
code. Few of the controls over the irresponsibility of the jury
contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been bor-
rowed by the new code. This was not the result of inadvertence
or oversight, as the Law Institute devoted the greater portion of
six days to the consideration of and debate on these points. The
Institute's conclusion that the plenary review of factual issues
by the appellate courts of Louisiana' 25 was the most effective
jury control possible, and was all that was needed for the rela-
tively few cases tried by jury in this state, accounts.for the
small number of changes made in this area. The article limiting
the cases which may be tried by jury make one, or possibly two,
slight changes in the law. 28 Alternate jurors are provided for.'2 7
Both special verdicts and answers to interrogatories to accom-
pany a general verdict are made available.' 2 The judgment non
obstante veredicto is recognized, but is limited to cases where a




125. Under LA. CONST. art. VII, §§ 10, 29 (1921).
126. A jury trial is not permitted in cases involving less than $1,000, nor in
workmen's compensation cases. Art. 1733.
127. Art. 1769.




Both additur and remittur are made available as alternatives to
a new trial.130
Judgments
The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is transferred to the
new code, but with one extremely important change. The Su-
preme Court had held, in Burton v. Lester'81 and subsequent
cases, that this statute could not be invoked where there was any
other adequate remedy available. These cases are overruled by
an article in the new code which provides that "the existence of
another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for dec-
laratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. ' 13 2
Notice of the signing of all final judgments in the district
court will be issued by the clerk. As under the prior law, this
notice will be served by the sheriff where the judgment was by
default and there was only domiciliary service of the citation.1 3 3
In all other cases, under the new code, the notice of judgment
will be mailed by the clerk to each counsel of record, and to each
party not represented by counsel. 34
The trial court is given the same power to assess costs in its
discretion, rather than against the party cast, which the appel-
late courts now enjoy.1 35
The rehearing in the trial court is abolished under the new
code, but this is a mere matter of terminology as the broadened
new trial may be granted "to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, or for reargument only."' 88 The rules regu-
lating the action of nullity are changed in one important, and
quite beneficial, respect. To avoid the prior difficulty due to con-
flicting lines of Supreme Court cases, as to whether a trial court
may annul a judgment either affirmed or rendered on appeal,
the new code requires such a nullity action to be "brought in the
trial court, even though the judgment sought to be annulled-may
have been affirmed on appeal, or even rendered by the appellate
court.' 3 7 The procedural rules regulating the revival of money
130. Art. 1813.
131. 227 La. 347, 79 So.2d 333 (1955).
132. Art. 1871. A further change, which affects actions for a declaratory judg-
ment adjudicating the ownership of immovable property, is mentioned in the dis-








judgments are transferred from the Civil Code to the new pro-
cedural code without change. 8
Appellate Procedure
The delays allowed generally for appeals are changed under
the new code. The prior delay of ten days, exclusive of Sundays,
allowed for a suspensive appeal is now increased to a flat fifteen
days. 139 The prior delay of one year allowed generally for devolu-
tive appeals is shortened to ninety days.14 0 The procedure for
obtaining an order of appeal has been simplified. Under the new
code, an order of appeal may be obtained either on oral motion
in open court, or by petition, regardless of the "term" of court
in which the order is sought or the judgment sought to be ap-
,pealed from was rendered.' 4' Regardless of the manner in which
an order of appeal is obtained, it is the duty of the clerk of the
trial court to mail notices of the order of appeal to counsel for
all parties other than the appellant, or to all other parties not
represented by counsel.14 2 The failure of the clerk to issue or
mail this notice does not affect the validity of the appeal.14 The
return day is governed by the same rules which obtained hereto-
fore, except that the trial judge is given authority to make any
necessary extension thereof, on application of the clerk, or of
the deputy clerk preparing the transcript. 144 As under the prior
law, the costs due the clerk of the trial court for preparing the
transcript must be paid him; but one important change requires
the payment to the clerk of the trial court of the filing fee which
will be due the appellate court, and the trial court clerk's pay-
ment of the latter to the appellate court clerk. 45 Regardless of
138. Art. 2031.
139. Art. 2123. An appeal from a justice of the peace or city court, or from
a district court in a case involving $100 or less, whether suspensive or devolutive,
must be taken within 10 days. See the discussion on Trial Courts of Limited Juris-
diction, infra.
140. Art. 2087. An appeal from a judgment granting or refusing an annulment
of marriage, separation from bed and board, divorce, awarding custody or alimony,
may be taken only within 30 days. Arts. 3942, 3943.
141. Art. 2121.
142. Ibid.
143. Such a failure of the clerk would entitle the appellee to an extension of
time in the appellate court to move to dismiss, answer the appeal, or file his brief,
as under the prior law when citation of appeal was necessary, was prayed for by
the appellant, but never issued or served.
144. Art. 2125. Though the new code does not go into effect until January 1,
3961, a similar provision is now contained in LA. R.S. 13:4438 (1950), as amend-
ed by La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1, which went into effect on July 1, 1960. This
latter statute was one proposed by the Judicial Council of Louisiana to implement
the recent appellate reorganization.
145. Arts. 2126, 2127. Though these code articles do not go into effect until
January 1, 1961, similar provisions are now contained in LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950),
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the court to which the appeal is taken, it is the duty of the clerk
of the trial court to transmit the record to the appellate court.14 6
No failure or delay of the clerk of the trial court in preparing or
transmitting this transcript is imputable to the appellant. 147
Under the prior law, an answer to the appeal might be filed
ordinarily as late as three days before the day assigned for argu-
ment in the appellate court. 48 Under the new code, an answer
to the appeal must be filed within fifteen days of the return day,
or the day on which the transcript is actually filed in the appel-
late court, whichever is later. 49
Execution of Judgments
A considerable number of changes in the law are made in this
area. The efficacy of the writ of fieri facias is extended from
seventy days to one year. 150 One of the implementing acts makes
two changes of importance to seizures generally, which are not
limited to those made under a writ of fieri facias. The con-
structive seizure of immovable property, as an additional mode of
seizure, is now possible throughout the state.' 5' This remedy,
modeled upon the former statute applicable only to Orleans and
Jefferson Parishes, is badly needed in cases where actual seizure
is either virtually impossible, or simply not feasible. For the
first time, money and movables on the person, or in the posses-
sion or under the control, of a defendant may be ordered deliv-
ered to the sheriff, under penalty of punishment for contempt
for a noncompliance.15 2
as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1, which went into effect on July 1, 1960.
See note 144 supra.
146. Art. 2127.
147. Ibid.
148. LA. CODE OF PRACTICE art. 890 (1870). In the courts of appeal, if the
case was assigned for argument within the first three days of any term, the
answer to the appeal might have been filed at any time prior to argument.
149. Art. 2133. This is somewhat of a reversion to the rule of LA. CODE OF
PRACTiCE art. 890 (1870), prior to amendment by La. Acts 1908, No. 103, § 1.
The change made in the new code was designed to effect a definite determination
of the issues to be presented to the appellate court as early as feasible, so as to
permit and encourage adequate briefing of all of these issues.
150. Art. 2294.
151. LA. R.S. 13:3851-3861 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6.
These new statutory provisions combine and replace both the former LA. R.S.
13:3857-3862 (1950), providing for the constructive seizure in Orleans and Jeffer-
son Parishes, and the former LA. R.S. 13:3851-3856 (1950), applicable to all
parishes except Orleans and Jefferson, providing for the recordation of a notice
of seizure of immovable property in the mortgage office of the parish, to serve
as notice of the privilege of the seizure.
152. LA. R.S. 13:3862 (1960), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6. This
statutory provision overrules legislatively a number of cases holding that contempt
of court was not an available remedy when a defendant refused to turn over
1960]
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The judicial sale under execution is changed in several re-
spects. The number of legal advertisements is reduced from the
former requirements of three for movables and five for im-
movables. Under the new code, only one legal advertisement is
required for movables, and two for immovables; but in each in-
stance the trial court may order additional advertisements when
requested and deemed advantageous.153 "When property is of-
fered by items or portions and the total price bid is insufficient
to satisfy the judgment, with interest and costs, or if the judg-
ment debtor so requests, the property shall be offered in globo
and thus sold if a higher bid is obtained.' ' 54 A prior statute,
heretofore applicable only to judicial sales in the Parish of Or-
leans, is now made applicable to the entire state by new statu-
tory provisions'5" adopted by one of the implementing acts.
These new statutory provisions permit: (1) the judicial adver-
tisement to designate a minimum percentage of the purchase
price to be paid on adjudication; (2) the adjudicatee to pay the
balance of his bid within thirty days; (3) the re-sale of the prop-
erty if the adjudicatee fails to comply with his bid within thirty
days; (4) subjecting the first adjudicatee to liability for the
difference between the amount bid originally and any lesser
amount bid at the re-sale, but not permitting him to profit from
any higher bid; and (5) the initial deposit is to be applied to-
wards the satisfaction of any resulting liability of the adjudica-
tee. This is another change which was badly needed and long
overdue.156
An unfortunate hiatus under the prior law tied the hands of
the sheriff and all junior creditors when property judicially sold
brought an amount sufficient to satisfy the claim of the seizing
creditor, but with a balance insufficient to satisfy all junior
mortgages and privileges. This is filled in by the new code. 5 7
money or other property on his person, or in his possession or under his control,
to the sheriff.
153. Art. 2331. The new LA. R.S. 43:203 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960,
No. 34, § 2, provides the rules for computing the publication dates for all judicial
advertisements, including those for judicial sales.
154. Art. 2295.
155. LA. R.S. 13:4359-4362 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6.
156. The prior law, in the other 63 parishes of the state, was unsatisfactory
and unworkable from the standpoint of both the seizing creditor and the adjudi-
catee. The obligation of the latter was to pay the full amount of his bid at the
moment of adjudication-an impossibility with respect to valuable property
which had to be financed. If he failed to do so, the only remedies of the seizing
creditor were either: (1) to have the property resold, and the first adjudicatee
thus released from all liability; or (2) to sue the adjudicatee to compel specific
performance of his bid.
157. "When the sum remaining after payment of the costs and the amount
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The rules relating to garnishment are changed in two impor-
tant aspects. The time allowed for an answer of the garnishment
interrogatories in district courts is increased from the prior ten
days (plus the distance differential) to a flat fifteen days. 158
The new code ends the need for the judicial straining which our
courts" were forced to employ in the past in a commendable effort
to avoid imposing heavy liability upon a garnishee who was
actually not indebted to the judgment debtor, but who failed to
answer the interrogatories timely through inadvertence. Under
the new code in such a case, the plaintiff must rule the garnishee
into court to show cause why the latter should not be condemned
to pay the full amount of the plaintiff's judgment or claim. The
garnishee's failure to answer the interrogatories timely then con-
stitutes prima facie proof of his indebtedness to the defendant
to the full extent of plaintiff's judgment or claim; but the gar-
nishee may now rebut this presumption by proving that he is not
actually so indebted, in whole or in part. Even when the gar-
nishee successfully carries this burden of proof, judgment is
rendered against him for costs and a reasonable attorney's fee
for the plaintiff.159 The continuing garnishment of wages, sal-
aries, and commissions has been left unchanged in the Revised
Statutes,160 and has not been incorporated into the new code. The
general exemptions from seizure are now shifted to the Revised
Statutes,' 6 ' without change.
A single article in the new code provides the procedure for
the enforcement in Louisiana of a judgment of a court of another
state or foreign country. Its provisions are merely declaratory
of the prior jurisprudential rules. 6 2
Summary Process
The short title in the new code on this subject provides, for
the first time, an adequate set of procedural rules for summary
due the seizing creditor is insufficient to pay such inferior claims in full, the
sheriff may deposit the remainder with the court and proceed by contradictory
motion against the inferior creditors to have their claims referred to the proceeds
of the sale." Art. 2377.
158. Art. 2412. However, the delay for answering garnishment interrogatories
in city and justice of the peace courts, and in the district courts in cases of $100
or less, is only five days, exclusive of legal holidays. The matter is discussed in
Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, infra.
159. Art. 2413.
160. LA. R.S. 13:3921-3927 (1950).
161. These provisions have been transferred from the repealed LA. CODE OF
PRACTICE art. 644 (1870) to LA. R.S. 13:3881 (1950), added by La. Acts 1960,




proceedings, which are based upon and taken from the prior case-
law. Only one real change is made in this title: exceptions and
an answer may be filed to a rule prior to the time assigned for
the hearing thereon. 163
Executory Process
All of the rules regulating executory proceedings are now
consolidated, and are stated clearly and distinctly. Only four rel-
atively minor changes are made in the law. A devolutive appeal
from an order of seizure and sale is no longer permitted.164 The
need for the conventional pact de non alienando in acts of mort-
gage is eliminated, as the code itself contains a statutory pact.18 5
Bond is no longer required when the injunction to arrest execu-
tory process is based on a lack of adequate authentic evidence' 66
A chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle evidenced by an act under
private signature duly acknowledged may now be enforced by
executory process. 6T
Succession Procedure
Those most closely connected with the Institute's work on
the new code have often expressed the opinion that the code's
greatest contribution to Louisiana law is made by the six titles
on succession procedure. It is believed that this view would be
justified if the new code went no further than to consolidate all
applicable rules on the subject, taken from the Civil Code, the
Code of Practice, the Revised Statutes, hundreds of important
cases, and from the customary practices in the state. As every
attorney in Louisiana has learned from painful experience, the
whole theory of succession procedure has been changed by the
adoption of the Inheritance Tax Acts; and no provision of the
Civil Code or Code of Practice could have been relied on without
an extensive research of the Revised Statutes and a mass of
jurisprudence. Now complete rules which can be relied on are
readily available, phrased in simple language which treats of
163. Art. 2593.
164. Art. 2642. This is actually no change, as the devolutive appeal under our
prior law was only a trap for the unwary. If the property was sold pending the




167. The prior doubt on this question, discussed in Comment (c) (3) of Art.
2631, has now been resolved by the amendment of LA. R.S. 32:710(K) (1950)
by La. Acts 1960, No. 33, § 1. This statute became effective 20 days after the
adjournment of the 1960 regular session of the legislature.
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present conditions and practices in Louisiana, rather than of
those in France a century and a half ago. The new code does not
content itself with this consolidation of rules of succession pro-
cedure. It has made the latter adequate for modern social and
economic conditions. Because of limitations of space, only the
more important of the changes in our succession procedure can
be discussed.
Under the prior law, when a probated testament was sought
to be annulled, the proponent bore the burden of proving authen-
ticity and validity, unless the presumptive heirs of the testator
residing in the parish had been notified of the time the testa-
ment was to have been probated, in which event the opponents
of the testament carried the burden of proof. 18 The new code
takes a more realistic approach by not requiring any such notice,
and allowing the time element to determine which party has the
burden of proof. If the testament is sought to be annulled with-
in three months of its probate, the proponent carries this burden;
if sought to be annulled later, the opponent must shoulder the
onus of proof. 16 9
The acceptance of successions purely, simply, and uncondi-
tionally is quite advantageous to the heirs in many instances, but
it may deprive creditors of the deceased of the protection af-
forded in all common law jurisdictions, where administration for
six months or longer is required in all cases. The new code offers
much more effective protection to succession creditors than was
available theretofore when the succession was accepted without
an administration. After the heirs have accepted the succession
unconditionally and have been sent into possession, within three
months a succession creditor may force them to furnish security
for the payment of his claim, under penalty of having the succes-
sion reopened and administered.170
168. The prior rule had two disadvantages. Firstly, it required notice to
presumptive heirs in the parish who might not have had the slightest desire or
intention of opposing the probate, but who might have been stirred into precipitate
action through the notice. This was one of the main reasons why this notice was
seldom given. Secondly, it was designed for an era when people rarely left the
locality of their nativity, and was anachronistic, in view of the present migratory
habits of the American people. The prior rule offered no protection whatever to
those presumptive heirs who moved away from the parish, or out of the state.
169. Art. 2932.
170. Two different sets of provisions of law effect this. Under Arts. 3007,
8008, and 3034, within three months of the date of a judgment sending the heirs
into possession unconditionally, a creditor may rule these heirs into court to
compel them to furnish security for the payment of his claim, and for an ad-
ministration of the succession in default of the furnishing of this security. Third
persons who prior thereto had purchased succession property from these heirs, or
1960]
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. Under the prior law, even though an opposition to an applica-
tion for appointment as administrator was filed in only one or
two cases out of a thousand, notice of such an application had to
be advertised for ten days; and the administration could not
commence until this delay expired. Under the new code, no such
advertisement is necessary. To provide for the occasional. case
where the application would be opposed, any interested person,
after the death of a deceased, may petition the court where the
succession will be opened for notice of any application for letters
of administration. 1 71 When such a petition is filed within ten
days of the death of the deceased, or prior to the application for
appointment, notice of the application must be given to the peti-
tioner,17 2 who is allowed ten days to file his opposition thereto.17 3
If no such petition for notice is filed prior to the application for
appointment, and ten days have elapsed since the death of the
deceased, the court may act upon the application ex parte.
1 74
The prior rules governing the public inventory are retained
by the articles on the subject of the new code. 75 Under the In-
heritance Tax Act a sworn, descriptive list of the property of
the deceased had to be filed when there was no administration
of the succession and no formal inventory filed. In Orleans Par-
ish, a formal inventory was required by law in all cases where
the deceased's estate grossed ten thousand dollars or more. The
new code allows the person at whose instance an inventory would
otherwise be taken, in all cases, the option of submitting a sworn,
descriptive list of all succession property. 76 This is the article
which produced opposition to the new code from some of the
judges and attach6s of the Civil District Court for the Parish of
Orleans, and from some of the New Orleans notaries. 77
obtained mortgages thereon, are not prejudiced thereby. See Art. 3008.
A second set of statutory provisions enables a succession creditor, where there
has been no administration, to obtain a privilege on all of the property left by
the deceased by filing an affidavit of his claim in the mortgage office within three
months of the death of the deceased. This privilege affects movables left by the
deceased and then held by the heirs, and all immovables inherited from the de-
ceased, even though alienated by the heirs. LA. R.S. 9:5011-5016 (1950), added
by La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 6. These statutory provisions replace LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 1444-1464 (1870) regulating the action of separation of patrimony, which
were repealed by La. Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2. Conceivably in certain instances this
may cause the immovables left by a deceased to be in limbo for three months after





174. Arts. 3094, 3096.
175. Arts. 3131-3135.
176. Art. 3136.
177. Investigation by the Law Institute of the manner in which the prior law
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Probably the greatest defect of our prior succession pro-
cedure was due to the fact that the court had no power to author-
ize the succession representative to do a number of things which
are absolutely necessary for the efficient management of the
estate. The new code supplies this necessary judicial power.
After notice to the heirs and creditors, and a contradictory hear-
ing if any oppose the request for authority, the district court may
authorize: the compromise or modification of any action or right
of action by or against the succession ;178 the investment of the
idle funds of a succession ;179 the continuation of any business
owned by the deceased ;18o the lease of succession property ;181 the
performance of an executory contract ;182 and the borrowing of
operated in Orleans Parish indicated that in the great majority of cases the ap-
praisers appointed for succession inventories had no specialized knowledge of the
values of the property which they were called on to appraise, but were attachds
of the civil district court; that in some instances these appraisers never saw the
property which they appraised, and did nothing more than sign the inventory;
that in other instances bank accounts were "appraised," at considerable expense
to the heirs; and that in all cases the cost of these inventories in Orleans Parish
was completely out of line with their cost in the great majority of other parishes.
The Institute concluded that in many instances an inventory served no useful
purpose whatver; that in such instances the notarial and appraisers' fees con-
stituted legal "feather-bedding" which could neither be justified nor defended; and
that the prior practices in New Orleans constituted the very worst form of public
relations for the profession.
At its meeting on May 14, 1960, the Council of the Law Institute considered
a request that Art. 3136 be amended so as to require inventories for all successions
which were to be administered. This request was based on the argument that, in
such cases, an inventory by a disinterested notary was needed for the protection of
succession creditors, who otherwise might be defrauded through the intentional
omission of the applicant for letters to list items of property on the descriptive
list which were owned by the deceased. After due consideration, the Council con-
cluded: (1) that the information used by the notary in listing the property of the
deceased in an inventory always comes from the attorney who would prepare the
sworn, descriptive list; (2) that there is no more opportunity for the concealment
of succession assets by dishonest heirs in the sworn, descriptive list than in the
inventory; (3) that a fraudulent descriptive list can be corrected in exactly the
same manner as a fraudulent inventory; and (4) in some aspects, a sworn, descrip-
tive list provides greater protection to succession creditors, since a dishonest ap-
plicant who intentionally omits items of property from his list not only subjects
himself to punishment for contempt for deceit and imposition on the court, but
also subjects himself to a criminal prosecution for false swearing. The Council of
the Institute further noted that the inventory of Louisiana law is completely
unknown to the other 49 states of the Union, where the sworn, descriptive list has
always been used successfully.
LA. R.S. 47:2413(B) (1950) was amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 35, § 1, so
as to avoid any conflict with the provision of Art. 3136.
178. Art. 3198.
179. Art. 3223.
180. Arts. 3224, 3225.
181. Art. 3226. This article does not affect in any way the authority of a




money by the succession representative.'8 3
Statutes adopted since 1932 have liberalized the procedure for
selling succession property, both at private and at public sale.
These advances are retained under the new code, which further
makes it possible in all cases to sell succession property for any
purpose whatsoever. 1 4 As in sales under execution, the number
of advertisements for the public sale of succession property is
reduced to one advertisement for movables and two for immov-
ables, with power granted to the court to require additional ad-
vertisements when advantageous.18 5
The prior procedure for the submission of the claims of cred-
itors and their payment by the succession representative in due
course of administration is retained in the new code; but three
additional safeguards are afforded succession creditors. Firstly,
provision is made for the submission of a sworn, formal proof of
claim by a creditor. 186 The submission of this formal proof of
claim, even if rejected by the succession representative: (1) sus-
pends the running of prescription on the claim as long as the suc-
cession is under administration ;187 and (2) avoids the effect of
the statutory prohibition of parol proof of a claim against a
party deceased. 88 Secondly, the acknowledgment by a succession
representative of a claim, no matter how submitted, has greater
effects. 8 9 Thirdly, a creditor may petition the court for mail
notice by the succession representative of the filing of his tableau
of distribution. 90 If a copy of this petition is served on the suc-
cession representative, the latter must mail a notice to the peti-
tioning creditor of the filing of the tableau.' 9 '
The problem of the "overlooked asset" of a succession is
solved by the new code, which authorizes the re-opening of a






188. LA. R.S. 13:3721(4) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 1.
189. It would: (1) entitle the creditor to have his claim included on the
tableau of distribution; (2) create a prima facie presumption of the validity of
the claim, even though not included on the tableau; and (3) suspend the running
of prescription against the claim as long as the succession was under administra-
tion. Art. 3243. Further, it would avoid the effect of the statutory prohibition of
parol proof of a claim against a party deceased. LA. R.S. 13:3721(2) (1950), as





covered.192 Ancillary probate procedure is spelled out in the new
code, 1' 3 through a codification of the prior jurisprudential rules
on the subject.
As under the prior law, half-costs are provided for in small
successions, but the new code makes two important changes in
this area. Firstly, the "small succession" has had its maximum
increased from five hundred dollars to two thousand dollars.194
Secondly, it is not "necessary to open judicially the small succes-
sion of a person who died intestate leaving no immovable prop-
erty, and whose heirs are his descendants, ascendants, or surviv-
ing spouse."'' 9 In such instances, the heirs must submit to the
inheritance tax collector an affidavit stating the facts and de-
scribing the property of the deceased. 19 6 An endorsement by the
inheritance tax collector that no inheritance tax is due on a mul-
tiple original of such affidavit is full authority for the payment
of money or delivery of property owned by the deceased prior to
his death.19 7
Provisional Remedies
The number of conservatory writs has been reduced from five
to three, through the abolition of the harsh writ of arrest,19s and
the merger (without further change) of provisional seizure with
sequestration. 199 Garnishment, heretofore an incident only of
the writs of fieri facias and attachment, is also made available
192. Art. 3393.




197. Arts. 3433, 3434. None of the articles in the new code repeal, modify, or
affect the provisions of LA. R.S. 9:1513 (1950), allowing a surviving spouse to
withdraw $1,000 from the funds of a deceased on deposit, without a judgment of
possession or court order.
198. Preliminary Statement, PROJET OF THE LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE 547, 548 (1960).
199. Arts. 3572, 3575. Where the lessor employs sequestration to enforce his
claim for unpaid rent, the writ issues without bond. Art. 3575. A number of the
special statutes incorporated in Title 9 of the Revised Statutes, and one in Title
13 thereof, made provisional seizure available for the enforcement of the privileges
recognized therein. La. Acts 1960, No. 31, § 1, amends LA. R.S. 9:4501, 9:4502,
9:4601, 9:4622, 9:4721, and 9:4866 (1950) so as to make these privileges enforce-
able by sequestration without bond. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, § 6, adds a new LA.
R.S. 13:4002 (1950) to make sequestration without bond the remedy for the en-
forcement of the privileges of farm and plantation workers, and adds a new LA.
R.S. 13:3957 (1950) which provides that sequestration without bond may be used
wherever a statute authorizes the use of provisional seizure.
See also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2709 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No.
30, § 1.
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under the writ of sequestration.2 0 0 The necessity of posting the
citation and notice of seizure on the bulletin board of the court,
when the attachment is issued against a nonresident, is now elim-
inated. Citation and all other papers must be served upon the
attorney at law appointed by the court to represent the nonresi-
dent defendant.201 Under the prior law, attorney's fees were al-
lowed defendants only when the writs of attachment and seques-
tration were dissolved on motion, and prior to trial of the cases
on their merits. Under the new code, attorney's fees may be al-
rowed the defendants "whether the writ is dissolved on motion
or after trial on the merits. '20 2 The prior law required a release
bond of a defendant to effect the release of attached property
from seizure, but permitted the defendant to effect the release of
sequestered property under a forthcoming bond.20 3 This is
changed under the new code, which requires a release bond in
both cases. 20
4
Only one important change is made in injunction procedure.20 5
Real Actions
The Council of the Law Institute spent a very considerable
amount of time on this title, considering and rejecting several
possibilities for the simplification of the procedure in this area,
before accepting the one finally adopted. This attains the desired
simplicity, ties in much more closely with the concepts of the
Civil Code than did the Code of Practice, and retains the useful-
ness of all prior jurisprudence in this field. The former petitory
action and the former action to establish title are merged into a
broadened petitory action,20 6 with the possession (or lack of pos-
200. Art. 3503.
201. Art. 5091.
202. Art. 3506. This article restores the jurisprudential rule in effect in Lou-
isiana for more than a century, which allowed the court to apportion the services
of the attorney in dissolving the writ and defending the case on its merits. The
rule discarded by this article unfairly prejudiced a defendant whose valid motion
to dissolve was erroneously overruled, only to be sustained after a trial on the
merits, or on appeal.
203. The obligation of the release bond is to pay any judgment recovered by
the plaintiff, with the surety's obligation limited to the penal sum of the bond.
The obligation of the forthcoming bond is only to return the property when de-
manded by the sheriff, with no liability under the bond for ordinary wear and tear.
In the case of automobiles and other mechanical equipment, the forthcoming bond
greatly reduces the plaintiff's chances of enforcing his judgment against the prop-
erty seized.
204. Arts. 3507, 8508.
205. A suspensive appeal from a final injunction may no longer be taken by
the defendant as a matter of right, but now rests within the sound judicial discre-




session) of the defendant determining the type of burden of
proof imposed on the plaintiff.2 17 Through a broadening of the
definition of "disturbance in law" of the Code of Practice to in-
clude all of the grounds for the former j actitory action,20 8 the
latter is merged with the former possessory action into a broad-
ened possessory action.20 9 The judgment which may be rendered
in favor of a successful plaintiff in the broadened possessory
action not only would quiet him or restore him to possession, but
if he had prayed for this relief, it would also order the defendant
to assert his pretensions of ownership within a delay to be fixed
by the court (not less than sixty days), or be precluded there-
after from ever asserting such pretensions.2 10 The broadened
possessory action thus retains, for a person in possession, all of
the advantages of the former jactitory action. To fill in serious
hiatuses in the former procedure, an article in the new code pro-
vides that possession determines the burden of proof in actions
where the ownership of immovables is at issue directly or in-
directly, such as those for a declaratory judgment, concursus
proceedings, and expropriation cases.211
The cumbersome and tedious procedure of the former hy-
pothecary action (properly speaking) is simplified greatly. The
new code contains a statutory pact de non alienando which ap-
plies to all judicial and legal mortgages. 212 The creditor has to
reduce his claim secured by a legal mortgage to judgment; and,
of course, he would already have a judgment in the case of a
judicial mortgage. Property in the hands of a third person sub-
ject to a judicial or legal mortgage may be seized in the execution
of this judgment,21 3 with notice of the seizure of the property
served on both the judgment debtor and the then owner or pos-
sessor.21 4 As a practical matter, there is no change in the pro-
207. The new code retains the rule of the former petitory action, and all of the
jurisprudence thereof by requiring a plaintiff, when the defendant is in possession,
to "make out his title" to the property. When the defendant is not in possession,
the plaintiff is only required to "prove a better title thereto than the defendant."
Art. 3653. The latter rule is based on the sounder line of conflicting jurisprudence
with respect to the former action to establish title. See Comment (b) of Art. 3653.
208. Art. 3659. The defective and ridiculous definition of "disturbance in law"
of Article 52 of the Code of Practice appears to have been the reason for our
borrowing the jactitory action from Spanish procedure. France has gotten along
well for centuries without it, due to the broad definition in its jurisprudence of the
"trouble de droit" as a ground for employing the possessory action.
209. Arts. 3655-3662.
210. Art. 3662.







cedure for the enforcement of a conventional mortgage by an
ordinary proceeding.215 The remedies formerly available to a
defendant in the former hypothecary action (properly speaking)
are all available to the then owner or possessor of the property
seized, but he has to become the actor, and assert his rights
through injunction or intervention. 216
Separation from Bed and Board, and Divorce
The new code consolidates the procedure in these areas, which
is transferred from the Civil Code and the Revised Statutes.
Only two changes are made in the law, both of which are quite
important. Firstly, the venue in separation and divorce cases is
broadened appreciably: these actions "shall be brought in a par-
ish where either party is domiciled, or in the parish of the last
matrimonial domicile. ' 217 Secondly, the appeal taken from a
judgment in these cases "shall not suspend the execution of the




A full complement of articles is provided in the new code on
this subject, but, except as noted below, the title on the subject
merely consolidates the procedural rules thereon heretofore con-
tained in the Civil Code, the Revised Statutes, and the jurispru-
dence. There are only two important changes made. Firstly, the
court is given the same power to authorize necessary acts of
management by the tutor as is given it by the new code with
respect to the succession representative. 2 9 Secondly, the new
code adopts the "prudent man rule" for the investment and man-
agement of the minor's funds and property.220 This permits a
tutor, with the prior approval of the court,221 to invest the
minor's funds in "blue-chip" stocks which will rise in value if
inflation continues to progress, instead of compelling him to in-
vest in bonds which, if the present creeping inflation continues,
215. Since practically all conventional mortgages contain the pact de non
alienando. In the enforcement of a conventional mortgage by an ordinary proceed-
ing, notice of seizure need be served only on the judgment debtor, and there is no










may represent less purchasing power at the end of a long period
of investment than at the beginning.
Interdiction and Curatorship of Interdicts
The title on these subjects in the new code likewise affects a
consolidation of the procedural rules transferred from the Civil
Code, the Revised Statutes, and the jurisprudence. Only two
changes in the procedural law are made thereby, both in the same
article. Firstly, the clerk of court is required to record in the
conveyance records a notice of the filing of the suit for inter-
diction. Secondly, the curator is required to cause the registry
of the judgment of interdiction in the conveyance records of the
parish where the judgment was rendered, and of every other
parish where the interdict owns immovable property, within ten
days of the curator's appointment.
222
Partition Between Co-Owners
The title in the new code, consolidating the Civil Code, the
Revised Statutes, and the jurisprudential rules on the subject
makes a single important change in the procedural law, in the
chapter dealing with partition when an absentee is a co-owner.
An article therein provides that when plaintiff has prayed for a
partition by licitation and an absent defendant appears person-
ally and so prays, the court may order a partition in kind if the
property is susceptible of division.
223
Concursus Proceedings
The new code articles on this subject blend the jurispru-
dential rules of concursus and the provisions of the former Inter-
pleader Act. Two important changes are made thereby. Firstly,
the remedy is broadened to include the equitable bill in the nature
of interpleader, as well as interpleader itself; and thus protec-
tion is afforded not only against double or multiple liability but
also against double or multiple vexation from litigation as well.
The remedy is made available not only to a stakeholder who ad-
mits liability, but to a person who denies liability in whole or in
part, but who contends that, if subject to any liability, he is liable






respect to the penalty for failure of a defendant to answer
timely.225
Eviction of Tenants and Occupants
The articles in the new code on eviction combine the provi-
sions of the Eviction of Tenants Act and the Sharecroppers Evic-
tion Act. One quite important change in the law is made therein.
Under the new code, the notice to vacate must allow the tenant
or occupant not less than five days to vacate in all cases.226 Under
the prior law, the vacate notice had to allow at least five, ten, or
thirty days, depending on the circumstances.
Trial Courts of Limited Jurisdiction
This title in the new code provides the long-needed set of
uniform procedural rules for cases in the justice of the peace,
city, and municipal courts of civil jurisdiction, and in the district
courts in cases involving one hundred dollars or less - those
cases over which the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with justices of the peace. A number of important procedural
changes are made in this title.
The jurisdiction of all city courts is automatically raised to
their full constitutional maximum. 227
In all cases in all city courts, regardless of the amount in-
volved, in justice of the peace courts, and in cases involving one
hundred dollars or less in the district courts:
(1) The delay for answering is five days, exclusive of
legal holidays ;228
225. The prior act provided that, in such a case, the tardy claimant was
estopped from asserting his claim; but the courts, to avoid the imposition of such a
harsh penalty, held that it might not be imposed unless a default had been taken
and confirmed against the tardy claimant. This rule might have worked well when
only two claimants were impleaded, but when there were a large number of de-
fendants, some of whom had answered timely and some of whom had not, the rule
was impossible to apply. To solve this problem, Art. 4657 provides that if a
claimant impleaded fails to answer timely, any interested party may obtain an
order requiring him to answer within an additional delay, under penalty of being
precluded thereafter from answering. It is believed that such a reasonable sanction
will be enforced by the courts.
226. Arts. 4701, 4702. The requirement in Art. 4701 that the vacate notice
must be given not more than thirty days before the expiration of a lease which
has a definite term is to prevent the incorporation of such a notice in the lease at
the time of its execution.
227. Arts. 4832-4835. The jurisdiction of city courts in New Orleans is pre-
scribed by LA. CoNsT. art. VII, §§ 91, 92 (1921).
228. Arts. 4895, 4921, 4922(1), 4941, 4971, 5002.
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(2) An appeal, suspensive or devolutive, must be taken
within ten days ;229
(3) Answers to garnishment interrogatories must be
filed within five days, exclusive of legal holidays ;2o
(4) Notice of rendition of judgment is unnecessary, ex-
cept when rendered by default in a case where only domicil-
iary service of citation has been made ;21 and
(5) All exceptions must be filed with the answer.28 2
Applications for new trial are not allowed in justice of the
peace courts, and generally in city courts when the amount in-
volved is one hundred dollars or less ;233 but such applications are
allowed in city courts when the amount involved is more than
one hundred dollars,2 4 and in district courts, both in cases in-
volving one hundred dollars or less and in de novo appeals.25
Except as mentioned above, the procedure in city courts in
cases involving more than one hundred dollars is the same as in
the district court of the parish where the city is situated.2 6
The numerous, lengthy, and repetitious sections formerly in
Title 13 of the Revised Statutes on city and justice of the peace
courts have been re-drafted and simplified by one of the imple-
menting acts.2 7
Other Provisions of Act Adopting Code
The new procedural code is adopted by Section 1 of Act 15 of
1960. Other sections of this statute warrant notice. Section 2
authorizes the Louisiana State Law Institute to direct the con-
tinuous revision of the new code, so as to incorporate therein all
future procedural legislation. This employs the same pattern
229. Arts. 4899, 4921, 4922(6), 4942, 5002. The Civil District Court for the
Parish of Orleans has no jurisdiction over a case involving $100 or loss. LA CONST.
art. VII, § § 81, 91, 92 (1921). No appeal lies from a judgment rendered by any
other district court in a case involving $100 or less. Id. art. VII, § 29.
230. Arts. 4895, 4921, 4922(5), 4941, 4971, 5002.
231. Arts. 4898, 4921, 4922(4), 4941, 4971, 5002.
232. Arts. 4892, 4921, 4922(2), 4941, 4971, 5002.
233. Arts. 4897, 4921, 4941. A new trial may be applied for in a New Orleans




237. La. Acts 1960, No. 32, §§ 3 and 4, adopting a new Chapter 7, "City
Courts," composed of 76 new sections added as LA. R.S. 13:1871-2162 (1950),
and adopting a new Chapter 9, "Justice of the Peace Courts," composed of 7 new
sections added as LA. R.S. 13:2581-2587 (1950).
1960o
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
which has been adopted heretofore by the legislature to provide
for the continuous revision of the Revised Statutes. Section 3
contains the necessary severability clause.
Section 4 of the adopting statute provides that the provisions
of the new code, when effective, will apply to all civil actions
or proceedings instituted thereafter or then pending. However,
with respect to the latter, the act makes two important excep-
tions to cover the transition. The first provides that the adop-
tion of the new code will not
"decrease or shorten any procedural delay granted or allowed
by any law in existence immediately prior to, and which had
commenced to run but had not yet completely elapsed on, the
effective date."
The second exception provides that the adoption of the new code
will not "affect the validity or change the legal effect of any
judicial, official, or procedural act done or attempted, or of any
failure to act, prior to the effective date."
Section 5 repeals the Code of Practice and all laws in conflict
or inconsistent with the new code. The repealing section, how-
ever, specially excepts the 1960 legislation recommended by the
Judicial Council to implement the recent constitutional appellate
reorganization.3 8 To avoid the inevitable conflict of legislation
adopted later in the legislative session, Section 6 of the adopting
act specially provides that the provisions of the new code shall
control and prevail over any other 1960 statute in conflict there-
with, "regardless of which act is adopted later or signed later
by the Governor."
Section 7 provides that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
shall become effective on January 1, 1961.
238. La. Acts 1960, No. 38, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 13:4438, 13:4441, 13:4442,
13:4445, and 13:4446 (1950).
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